
**Colonial Present:**

**Legacies of the Past in Contemporary Urban Practices in Cape Town, South Africa**

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**Abstract:** This paper historicizes the contemporary urban development and governance strategies in Cape Town, South Africa by focusing on two periods: the British colonial era (mid to turn of the 19th century) and the neoliberal post-apartheid era (early 21st century). It reveals the keen affinity between a contemporary urban strategy known as Improvement Districts for the affluent and the old colonial practice of ‘location creation’ for the native. Discussing the similarities and differences in the material and discursive practices by which urban privilege is produced and maintained in Cape Town across the two eras, the study brings to light the colonial legacies of the neoliberal municipal strategies for governance of urban inequalities. This insight is significant to the citizens’ resistance against exclusionary redevelopment projects that claim ‘innovation’ in urban management.

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**Keywords:** colonial urban governance; neoliberal urban policies; urban redevelopment; Business Improvement Districts; post-apartheid and colonial Cape Town

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Legacies of the Past in Contemporary Urban Practices in Cape Town, South Africa

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The contemporary urban scholarship in South Africa has often focused on the post-apartheid and the apartheid periods. The emergent policies for development and management of urban areas are frequently examined to understand continuities and changes with respect to apartheid practices. Analysis of the post-apartheid urban policies typically pays attention to links to the globalized urban strategies associated with the neoliberal framework. Usually, the assumption holds that these neoliberal urban strategies originated in the global North during the 1970s and were subsequently rolled out to the rest of the world by the contemporary institutions of global command in the 1980s through what is known as the Washington Consensus. This shallow historical account of contemporary post-apartheid urban strategies fails to explore the colonial legacies of neoliberal urban development and governance strategies. This ahistorical approach risks accepting post-apartheid strategies for development and governance of cities as ‘new’ and ‘innovative’ without any roots in earlier periods of South African history.

To address this shortcomings the present essay focuses on two key moments in the urban and real estate development of Cape Town: the British colonial era and the post-apartheid neoliberal era. It seeks to understand the municipal struggles over urban infrastructure development during the colonial period and how those might have influenced the contemporary strategies for urban governance and development. Connecting these moments serves to historicize seemingly ‘new’ struggles and ‘new’ practices of municipal governance. The essay is organized in three parts. Part one focuses on the colonial era 1840 to the turn of the twentieth century. It offers an account of the class, ethnic and racial struggles involved in production and governance of Cape Town as a nineteenth century capitalist city entering the twentieth century as the segregated city would become. This part is informed by a vast scholarship, including the published historical work by Bickford-Smith, Van Heyningen and Worden, Bickford-Smith, Warren and Broodryk, Mabin and Smit and Swanson that document the contestations over urban development issues in Cape Town during this period. Part two concerns the first decade of the 21st century and a specific post-apartheid urban redevelopment strategy implemented in this period called City Improvement Districts (CIDs) or Special Rate Areas (SRAs). This part draws on field work in Cape Town (2000-2006) supplemented by current information gathered from newspapers and CIDs promotional material accessed on line. Final section of the paper offers a comparative historical analysis of the discourses and strategies used for development and management of urban privilege in Cape Town during the colonial and the contemporary periods. It highlights the Cape Town city center as a space that has been the site of
fierce historical struggles for urban citizenship and inclusion and reveals the similarities and differences in strategies for development and urban governance across the two periods.

The main findings of this research are the following: Contemporary ‘zonification’ strategies commonly referred to as improvement districts (BIDs) and in Cape Town referred to as CIDs or SRAs have keen affinity with the old colonial practice of ‘location creation.’ While colonial practices of ‘location creation’ segregated those at the bottom of the social hierarchy (the non-Europeans) to secure access to cheap labor, the creation of BIDs, CIDs or SRAs, construct special locations for those higher up in the social hierarchy to secure and promote spaces of consumption. In both eras ‘fear’ is mobilized to justify creation of special location and segregation. What fear of disease did at the turn of the previous century, the fear of crime has accomplished at the turn of the present century. In its neoliberal version however ‘locations’ (CIDs and SRAs) are created through seemingly voluntary community-based decisions, unlike the colonial era where administrative orders from a Public Health Officer brought locations into existence. In line with Gillian Hart’s relational comparisons this essay tries to reveal the “interconnected historical geographies” of Cape Town and forms of exclusion produced, to understand “how they feature in the present.”7 This I hope furthers resistance to contemporary exclusionary projects of Cape Town redevelopment by exposing their advocates’ claim of ‘innovation.’

A wealth of research on colonial urban governance and development informs this research. These investigations reveal how the colonial interests in establishing and reinforcing domination and social control were mediated through the built environment to achieve the imagery and materiality of superiority and privilege.8 While colonial accounts of this process focused on notions of ‘hygiene,’ more recent historical scholarship documents urban infrastructure and municipal services development as a highly contested terrain and center of political struggle. For example, McFarlane’s account of colonial Bombay contends that the “The biopolitics of sanitation [is] . . . about facilitating the production of . . . a capitalist city.”9 His writing demonstrated how infrastructure development has been a highly politicized subject of debate not only in the metropole10 but also in colonies and implicated — discursively and materially — in technologies of rule. To govern the colonies, McFarlane11 describes how urban inequalities in Bombay were enrolled in the sanitary discourse; Gandy12 echoes this view in his work on colonial Lagos, arguing that British colonial administrators sought to transform this Nigerian port into the “Liverpool of West Africa.” Similar perspectives emerge in Perera’s13 work where he shows how British town planning aimed to modify colonial Colombo through means of legislative and design to produce the capitalist city over the colonial city. Urban services such as water,14 garbage collection and street sweeping15 have also been the subject of this new research. For instance, Parnell16 depicts how the Medical Officers of Health (MOH) in one British colony were often involved in the formation of Public
Health Acts in another, while Swanson\(^\text{17}\) homed in on the way in which the ‘sanitation syndrome’ was instrumental in the colonial technologies of governance. A number of writers\(^\text{18}\) have described how public health hazard and epidemic outbreaks often served as triggers for segregation projects that created a *cordon sanitaire* to spatially separate Europeans and non-Europeans. In some instances colonial authorities referred to the living environment of the colonized as the ‘septic fringe’ of the city and as a ‘medical menace.’ Such dehumanizing discourse laid the groundwork for ‘segregation for sanitation’ as a slogan to justify removal of non-Europeans to segregated zones called ‘locations’ — a strategy that generally contributed to the Europeans’ urban privilege and wealth creation. In fact, in South Africa these locations created the bedrock for a full-blown apartheid urbanization. The contemporary urban struggles by residents for citizenship and urban services improvement are not divorced from past struggles that have shaped these physical and social landscapes. As Terence Ranger\(^\text{19}\) reminds us, these struggles are confrontations between state and city that are not just the result of the present conjuncture but expression of extreme structural tensions which have operated for the last couple of centuries.

**Part One: 19th Century Colonial Period**

The second half of the 19\(^\text{th}\) century (1840 to 1900) was an important period for the urban development of Cape Town. Two decades were key in shaping the urban landscape and municipal politics in this period: the 1840s, and the 1880s. Large injections of capital into the city at those times “greatly changed the nature of urban growth” and shaped not only the city’s physical infrastructure but also its class interests, ethnic and racial identities, urban politics and municipal governance.\(^\text{20}\)

The first wave of investment in the early 1840s, followed the abolition of slavery in the Cape Colony. Though the initial abolition of slave trade in the early 1808 freed slaves from trading ships and brought a new population of ‘prized Negros’\(^\text{21}\) to Cape Town it was not until 1838 that slavery was abolished in the Cape Colony sparking the new formation of urban landscape and politics. Capital to drive this process came primarily from large sums that the Queen paid to slave holders to compensate for property loss. These transfers supplied disposable cash for Cape Town’s real estate capital.\(^\text{22}\) A large amount of this money went to construct the upscale buildings of the city center that are now Cape Town’s historic core. Much of the remainder helped build the residential tenements in the city’s outskirts, for which there was a growing demand from the emerging class of wage laborers and former slaves.

The second wave of large capital reached the city in the last two decades of the 19\(^\text{th}\) century, following the 1869 discovery of diamonds in Kimberly. Cape Town and its harbor, where the colony’s extracted riches were exported to Europe, benefited from the prosperity of the Cape Colony. The city’s harbor was improved and the construction of a railroad terminus connected the Cape to the main road to Rhodesia and the interior. This massive development of infrastructure facilitated Cape Town’s
geographical expansion and the building up of housing stock, while the value of properties and revenues soared. Towards the end of the 19th century, Cape Town became the commercial center dominating the Western Cape, attracting the headquarters of banks, and land and insurance companies.

The large injections of capital into the city during these periods also catalyzed sharp class conflicts over production and control of urban space. The decisions about infrastructure that shaped the uneven development of Cape Town and its contentious politics both consolidated class interests and shaped the structure of its first municipal government. I will discuss these further below.

**Abolition of Slavery in the Cape Colony and Development of Cape Town: 1830s to 1850s**

As the sudden delivery of cash to the former slave holders found its way to urban real estate and economic activities in Cape Town, the growing population and activities of the city created urban conditions that cried for attention and infrastructure development. Warren and Broodryk describe the conditions of Cape Town in the late 1830s as so filthy that they were blamed for the outbreak of smallpox in 1839. They write of slaughtering taking place in public areas, of a six-foot-wide open sewage channel that ran down the middle of the streets. They describe the city’s main sewer being as an open drain. In other words, the urban environment was a virtual catalyst for the promotion of disease.

To take care of the material welfare of its growing inhabitants and oversee provision of water, and cleaning and lighting of the streets, the colonists pressed for creation of independent government in the Cape. They demanded widening the municipal franchise from the traditional urban merchant elite who had dominated the corporations to include the middle class. The 1836 Ordinance enabled towns in the colony to opt for self-government. From 1836 to 1840 Cape Town saw an intense class struggle over criteria for inclusion in self-governance: who could vote and who could be elected. This struggle was mobilized through Cape Town’s first municipal government and its constitution by two Municipal Boards: the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Wardmasters. The two municipal Boards articulated the class conflicts over the burgeoning real estate in Cape Town, and the uneven development of urban infrastructure and distribution of urban improvements that followed.

The Wardmasters Board represented the tenants and small landlords, the petit bourgeoisie. The Board of Commissioners, on the other hand, represented the elite merchants and the colonial government. This mercantile elite represented the interests of colonizers, with no long-term commitment to Cape Town. Home was England, where they would return once they retired from their businesses in the Cape. Because Cape Colony was far from sources of fuel, industry was minimal, and the Cape’s economy mostly relied on trade and export of agricultural goods. From 1840 to 1870, major political power lay
with the British elite merchants who dominated colonial business interests. Through the Board of Commissioners the merchant elite exerted their power over municipal decisions.

The commissioners allocated municipal resources largely to advance the interest of the propertied and commercial classes with import-export links to the UK. Privileging the city center in the allocation services, the Commissioners acted not only in self-interest, but also in the interest of the colonial government. The center of Cape Town, today referred to as the historic core or Business District, is where the main offices for the mercantile elite as well as the banks and insurance companies were located.

Using 1841 memos of residents’ complaints, Warren and Broodryk show how the town center always received priority, whether it was for police force, light or other services. For example, city center streets like Short Market street had gas lighting and were the first to benefit from paving in 1849, while peripheral roads were left in the dark and seldom paved. Warren and Broodryk also chronicle poor householders’ complaints about nothing being spent for the poor quarters of town. They claimed that town carts failed to make their round to pick up trash, leaving filth and rubbish to take over their neighborhoods. These resident complaints suggest Cape Town’s uneven investments in improvement and development.

Public works expenditures further substantiate these inequalities. In 1840-1841, for example of the £6,178 spent on public works, £2,083 (one third) went into the central district. This included the Market Square and Caledon Square area or the commercial heart of the town bounded by main roads like the Heerengracht, Keisergracht and Buitengracht, Wale, Strand, Buitenkant and (lower) Long Street, which were also the first roads in Cape Town to be repaired.

Wardmasters opposed such selective allocation of expenditure and asked for “gradual improvements in various parts of the municipality.” But the conflict that arose in this period of heightened demand for urban services, was not only between the Wardmasters Board and the Commissioners Board. It was also between municipal Boards and the colonial government over the definition of the responsibilities of the municipal and colonial governments and householders. Water supply, for example, was a contested issue that ultimately catalyzed the 1842-47 anti-colonial struggles of the Cape Town Municipality and united the Wardmasters and Commissioners Boards. At the time, municipal revenues were drawn half from the general rate on immovable property and half from occupiers of houses paying for water. To recover the cost of water, the Municipal Boards proposed in 1841 making crown properties taxable and requiring the colonial government to pay for its use of water. Wardmasters and commissioners voted in favor of the resolution, a move that the colonial government opposed. Since the colonial government adhered to the policy of indirect rule, their goal was to reduce the cost of colonial government. Paying extra taxes plus water tariffs flew in the face of colonial policy.
for reduced government costs. The British retaliated by threatening the town treasury\textsuperscript{42} and making non-compliance with colonial policy punishable by cancelation of all financial aid to the municipality, thus crippling the municipality’s resources. The municipality gave in, not only lifting taxes on colonial properties, but exempting them from water payment.\textsuperscript{43}

The rising anti-colonial sentiment of the Commissioners Board, as in the above controversies, contributed to a change in its composition that eliminated British elite members by 1848. The mercantile grouping among the Commissioners also left municipal office because they were disillusioned by the growing radicalism of a Cape Town municipality that promoted the interests of businesses and property, and the political strength of the burgeoning landlords and commercial class.\textsuperscript{44} Also by mid-century, the composition of the two Boards had become similar. A number of Commissioners were among those who had become wealthy and landed proprietors later in life; some had even served as Wardmasters. This changing composition of the Commissioners Board meant that the two Boards started to line up together on several municipal issues.\textsuperscript{45}

Anti-colonial sentiments and the push for independent, representative government and ‘free institutions’ in the Cape were allied with political processes in England that were going through their own process of endorsing liberal principles.\textsuperscript{46} By the early 1850s the struggle for representative government and independence from the colonial administration succeeded.\textsuperscript{47}

Cape Town took the lead among the municipalities of the Cape Colony in establishing a representative municipal government. Commissioners and Wardmasters united in calling for a town meeting of householders. In March 1853 the Constitution Ordinance was ratified and the Cape Colony was granted representative government independent of the colony. In 1854 the House of Assembly dominated by the commercial class was created.\textsuperscript{48} Triumphant forces in the Colony celebrated a new era in Cape affairs as a victory of the commercial middle class defending the interests of the local business over the mercantile elite whose primary interest was not in the colony but their allied companies in the UK.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Discovery of Diamonds in Kimberly: 1870s to Turn of the Century}

The temporary unity that the commercial middle class had found with the lower and middle proprietor class through anti-colonial sentiments and interests was fractured during the last two decades of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{50} This was due to an intense process of urbanization that followed the 1869 discovery of diamonds in Kimberly. Since the diamonds and profits of Kimberly were exported to UK through Cape Town, the Cape Colony shared Kimberly’s prosperity. A new set of conflicts then arose over infrastructure development and governance of Cape Town’s city center. New dynamics of class interests
in urban space marked a second critical period in Cape Town’s uneven development and municipal governance.

The years 1870 to 1900 saw an injection of capital into Cape Town. The harbor was improved, and a new railroad terminus connected the main road to Rhodesia and the interior. The Cape Governor’s total revenue rose from £580,026 in 1869 to £1,103,888 in 1872 and £6,317,574 in 1897-8. Cape Town thus became a commercial center dominating the Western Cape and attracting the headquarters of banks, land and insurance companies; Cape Colony could raise loans on the London market. The city also grew in area, the number of houses and value of properties. The city revenues also expanded from £29,000 in 1865, to £37,000 in 1880; to £184,662 in 1898; and to £77,000 in 1904.

The development of the Cape Town city center in the 1870s came about largely due to the efforts of a relatively small (150 member) group of merchants who owned shops, warehouses and insurance offices and who also controlled the local banks. The mercantile elite who had invested in diamonds and insurance companies also had the security of bank loans not only for expanding their businesses, but for investment in residential property. By late 1870s, Cape Town was witnessing a significant building boom dominated by a few families who owned the bulk of real estate. Beneficiaries of the big building boom of the late 1870s included families like the Wichts who owned 12 percent of the housing stock in the city.

Greater urbanization of Cape Town in the last two decades of the 19th century galvanized local politics. The Act of 1881-1882 replaced the Municipal Boards with a Municipal Council which had enhanced powers. This transformation brought to the fore the question of who would control the municipal government and the Council. The section that follows explains how this power was tied to wealth and ethnicity and later to race. While the political citizenship and the right to elect and be elected was linked to property ownership, through a set of discursive means the urban hegemony of English as a superior European ethnicity was established and ultimately controlled municipal politics. This superiority led to resident segregation of Europeans and non-Europeans and the exclusion of the latter (a mixed black population) from urban center and enjoyment of urban infrastructure development. In the last two decades of the 19th century, the development of infrastructure and the discourse on sanitation was shaped by ethnicity, race and class interests. Out of this came the urban inequalities of the 20th century.

**Property Ownership: Key to Urban Citizenship**

The new ruling class in the late 19th century was intent on limiting the franchise. A Cape Times editorial on August 12th, 1882 contended that universal municipal voting rights would flood the constituency “with an overwhelming tide of ignorance and besotted obstinacy.” Fearing that landlords would influence the votes of “poor and ignorant” tenants, elites advocated one vote per building and
limited even that to buildings of more than £100 in value. They took a Bill to the parliament that later became Municipal Act 28 of 1885, which deprived the owners or occupiers of cheap housing the right to vote. Fearing that in multi-tenant buildings’ several votes would be influenced by their landlords, this Act was refined by clause 5, Act 26 of 1890 which further limited voting right as a privilege of “[e]very person who is owner of . . . property. . . assessed municipal value of not less than £100 . . . and every occupier or tenant when there is not more than one occupier or tenant of such property . . . of one hundred pounds.” At the time, only about 20 percent of municipal properties qualified.

In 1893 the municipality passed an even more exclusionary Act (Act 25, 1893), assigning multiple votes to citizens according to the value of their property:

- 1 vote for owner or occupier of property worth £100 to £400
- 2 votes for property worth £500-£999
- 3 votes if value was more than £1000.

This Act certainly aided the propertied class in the city. Each firm whose building was worth more than £1000 could cast three votes — or even more if they also owned other property.

With the larger property owners in control of municipal governance, money was lavished in their neighborhoods in the center of the city while the outlying areas continued to be neglected. Elite merchants, as the majority of the City Council, could ensure that public works and urban improvement investments would be concentrated in the city center, where their business properties were located. They benefited from this bias both by added value to their property and business in the city center and as shareholders of the city’s Tramway. This uneven infrastructure development of Cape Town institutionalized through municipal government meant that the city’s poor neighborhoods rarely saw improvement. One of the few such investments by Council was the 1895 undertaking to build laborers’ barracks for single men. In 1898, responding to a complaint by “working men of union” from District Six that the Council entirely neglected their area, the Council responded that they had spent £15,180 there in that year — a pittance given the Council’s total expenditures of £298,843.

Sanitation Discourse in Municipal Politics: Dirty and Clean Parties

Following Cape Town’s economic boom and rapid growth beginning in the 1870s, doctors, journalists and engineers who came from Europe always looked to the “mother country” for advice on urbanization. As other historians and geographers have documented, Municipal Commissioners who championed certain sanitary reforms in the cities of the colonies like Cape Town or Bombay, were deeply influenced by the public health movement in Victorian Britain.
residents who had lived in British cities criticized the Cape Town Council for sanitary reform in 1875, demanding a thorough system of drainage, garbage collection and paved streets.\textsuperscript{62} 

One needs to keep in mind that in Cape Town of 1872 the population as a whole had grown to 45,000 and municipal population had reached 33,000 people. Sewage still ran in on open drains, water was not adequately supplied, and night soil was collected in buckets that poor households cleared themselves while affluent households paid private contractors for pick up.\textsuperscript{63} These were conditions that by 1876 gave Cape Town its reputation as ‘city of stinks.’ The smallpox epidemic of 1882 galvanized support for cleaning and modernizing the city infrastructure. A group of councilors among the elite mercantile class calling themselves reformers managed to introduce a Bill passed into law in 1882 amending the Municipal Act in favor of higher taxes, greater supply of free water by landlords to renters (from 50 gallons to 100 gallons per day per dwelling), and greater borrowing power for the municipality to invest in infrastructure.\textsuperscript{64} Despite resistance mounted by ratepayers, the so called reformers stayed in power in the City Council from 1882 to 1902. At the end of their rule in 1902 they claimed victory, declaring Cape Town “clean and modern!”\textsuperscript{65}

The bulk of Cape Town’s urban and sanitary development that took place in this period, indeed occurred through intense struggle over class interests, ethnic identity and imperial hegemony. These struggles were mobilized through two political parties that the media labeled Dirty Party and Clean Party.\textsuperscript{66}

The Dirty Party was composed of the middle-class, landed proprietors and landlords who lived off renters, some of whom owned up to 11 houses.\textsuperscript{67} They were mostly Afrikaners, with Malays making up their lower ranks. They opposed many of the municipal expenditures, advocating no change in tax, no change to water regulation, and no increase in the municipality’s debt/borrowing power, which they argued would lead to extravagance. They wanted the renters to pay the water cost, asserting that the poor would waste water if it was free. “The dry dirt is comparatively innocuous,” one opposition to the proposed reform stated. “It is the waste of water in all little lanes and alleys that has been the source of more annoyance than anything else can possibly be. When these people [i.e., the tenants] had to go to the public pumps they did not waste the water.”\textsuperscript{68} The party that represented landlords and their interests was excoriated as slumlords, not caring for health of the city, accustomed to filth in the streets and overcrowded houses—‘dirty.’

The Clean Party was composed of the merchant class and the business owners, mostly English-speaking Europeans with fluid capital from businesses in the UK. They lived in the suburbs but had stores or businesses in the center city. They advocated raising rate payers’ taxes for sanitation and infrastructure development, as they were less affected by many of those charges. For example, the
obligation of landlords to pay for tenants’ water usage did not impose on the merchants, and the proposed increase in the property rate from 2d to 3d in the £ did not hurt them as much.\textsuperscript{59} The mercantile elite and their business in Cape Town benefited from as much improvement in the central business area as the Municipal Council could afford. These improvements increased their property values, enhanced trade in the central city and improved roads and thoroughfares. Moreover, they were shareholders of the tramway and made money from the projects in the downtown area.

The reformers, in short, were mostly British merchants and elites closely connected with global capital, whose orientation was towards the U.K. While for British reformers home was England, for the Afrikaner landed proprietors, home was Cape Town. This came out in many aspects of life style, including the political conflict. Reformers, who looked to Britain for advice and inspiration were called elitist because they focused on the central city, were keen to take loans from Britain for municipal government, and more concerned with their relationships off shore than with those in the outskirts of their own city.

Newspapers were allied with the mercantile class who were the source of their advertisement revenues. Hence, through self-interest as well as the real horror of the smallpox epidemic of 1882, the media branded the opposition as the Dirty Party.\textsuperscript{70} Newspapers campaigned effectively against Dirty Party with cartoons and poems, helping the Clean Party to win the 1882 Council elections and stay in power for two decades.

The late 19th century politics of class and ethno racial conflicts were embroiled in controversy over which districts would receive sanitation infrastructure. Self-serving media of the time represented such conflicts as a clash between the values of clean and dirty, whereas at their core this was a conflict over (re)distribution of public works investments. The Dirty Party was not against improved sanitation services; it opposed providing them selectively to only a few districts. But to make sure that opposition did not control urban governance, the colonial elite relied on a discourse of sanitation to construct an ethnicized and racialized “other.” The municipal sanitary development discourse helped to establish British urban hegemony, and construct the notion of the superiority of Englishness as an ethnicity: cleaner, more civilized, and more global (i.e. connected to Europe).

But late 19th century sanitation discourse marked not only the hierarchical construction of ethnic identities among white Europeans (Afrikaner versus British). It also hardened racial attitudes in Cape Town to set up the bedrock for race-based segregated South Africa.

**The Use of Sanitation Discourse for Urban Segregation**

Two decades after the abolition of slavery, and following the opening of diamond mines in Kimberly and the economic boom of Cape Town, the number of Africans in the city was growing. As they spread across the city, journalists issued warnings about the danger of Africans along with the discourse of crime and sanitation.

Swanson eloquently discusses turn of the century Cape Town and how the discourse of “segregation for sanitation” with each epidemic emergency helped to naturalize race-based segregation of Europeans and non-Europeans. He describes the turn of the century Cape Town as:

“an old, slum-ridden town composed of a colonial society in which, in general, whites existed in favoured circumstances surrounded and served by 'coloured', Malay, 'Asiatic' and 'Kafir' or 'native servants' . . . . with a rapidly increasing numbers of black rural migrants from the eastern Cape and Transkei . . . left on their own to 'pig it' where and how they could. . . . Faced with the plague crisis, the first and most powerful anxieties of the medical officers and the emergency Plague Administration focused on the presence of the Africans ('Kafirs'), whom they associated directly and inherently with the social and sanitary conditions that harboured the plague. 'Rest the blame where it may,' Cape Town's Medical Officer, Barnard Fuller wrote later, ‘these uncontrolled Kafir hordes were at the root of the aggravation of Cape Town slumdom brought to light when the plague broke out.”

The sanitation gospel ‘Sanitas, Sanitas, Omnia Sanitas’ therefore served to create a toxic relationship among three Ss: stereotype, sanitation and segregation that held the seeds of full apartheid.
Swanson’s study of the turn of the century Cape colony reveals that the imagery of infectious disease served as a social metaphor to influence the urban policies and shape institutions of segregation. In much of 19th century colonial Africa the Medical Officers of Health declared areas occupied by native dwellers as ‘the septic fringe’ of the city and medical menace. These hygienic anxieties of the twentieth century that created the colonial pattern of African and European urban communities separated by a cordon sanitaire of uninhabited ground, were often associated with an epidemic emergency. For example, the Public Health Act, inspired by the devastating small pox epidemic of 1882-3 was used in 1901 when the first human cases of plague appeared in the city among Cape Colored and African dockworkers. The municipal and colonial Medical Officers of Health (MOH) anxiously informed their governments that “the dreaded Bubonic Plague-the scourge of India–had at length made its appearance in our midst.” Following the rash of fear which galvanized the city in 1901, 6000 or 7000 Africans were relocated to Uitvlugt, a sewage farm on Cape Flats.76

But the use of epidemic emergency and the building of locations such as Uitvlugt for blacks was not sufficient. As emergencies receded, blacks drifted back into the town and moved beyond the designated areas. Plus, these new black residential areas were not economically viable. In fact, the financial responsibilities towards these native locations were not clarified. Uitvlugt, for instance, was incurring £1500 a year deficit.77 In 1899 a special jurisdiction was provided access to cheap native labor and allowed employers to house their occupier the employer assumed financial responsibility for the location, but no statute dealt directly with areas under municipal authority.

Tossing back and forth the ball of obligation regarding responsibility for poor urban Africans is an age old practice. At the turn of the twentieth century the conflict was between the colonial government and the local administrators. The colonial Native Affairs Department (NAD) did not wish to be responsible and argued that towns (local municipalities) should create and fund private locations as they were beneficiaries of private location bill, not the colony as a whole. They also suggested that each location “should pay its way.”78 They even went so far to ask Sea Point, a centrally located area within Cape Town, to become its own private location and hence be able to control and segregate natives within its jurisdiction.79

The colonial project of social control through spatial segregation was not easy, writes Swanson (1977). It was frustrated not only by administrative and practical contradictions but also by resistance from the middle class ‘black’ emerging with property in the peri-urban settlements and also by both white employers and black laborers only marginally accepting the segregation proposition. This difficulty, however, was removed when the discourse of hygiene and health was mobilized and the black urban settlements were equated with a public health hazard or medical menace.80
Swanson shows that sanitation discourse was key to the formation of racial ecology of Cape Town to segregate natives while allowing employers to access cheap labor. The official argument for segregation initially was not a racist but a medical one, he writes. Segregation discourse changed over time from a hygiene based to one that was a sort of common sense naturalized in relation to race. Tracing the intricacies in the trajectory of sanitation discourse, the outbreak of epidemic diseases in the colony played their role. The recurrent epidemic diseases helped reinforce a race-based segregationist discourse, pointing at higher rates of disease in impoverished, poorly-serviced native quarters. For example, the Public Health Act of 1883 implemented after the 1901 plague was used after the 1918 influenza epidemic to lay the foundation for Union-wide segregation policy. The actual laws for segregation followed thereafter.

The 19th century town planning obsession with hygiene also contributed to the segregation of European and Africans. Colonial officers transferred the ideals shaped at home in fighting urban morbidity to the colonies. But the hygiene obsessions that were born in Europe, were implemented differently in the colony. While in the UK explicit race-based segregation or exclusion was condemned as contrary to the liberal values of the individual’s liberty and equality, those principles evaporated in the colonies. As scholars have documented, in the colonies liberalism was a product of its habitat, meaning Europeans honored their liberal values in Europe not in the colonies. In Australia, for example, British liberal visionaries and settlers of the 19th century explicitly argued against Chinese immigration and stopped them from deboarding in harbor of its colony of Victoria. Lake argues that this paradox of racial exclusion is because of, not in spite of, liberals’ commitment to liberty and democracy.

In the Cape colony the need for labor that brought Africans to Cape Town and the simultaneous fear of the “other” presented white liberals with a painful dilemma. Urban reform and the English discovery of the sanitation gospel handily offered segregation as a solution. As early as 1879 the government’s labor contractor, Mr. Stevens, suggested a segregated Cape Town location for Africans. Stevens proposed a cordon sanitaire both to protect whites from disease and to teach blacks about “the superiority of the European race.” At first segregation was promoted, but not enforced. Africans could still live where they could afford to rent. Soon enough, however, following the 1901 plague epidemic compulsory residence in a “location” for blacks was decreed.

The process of creating an elitist city and urban space historically has required both discursive and regulatory means. During apartheid, regulatory segregation was explicitly race-based and bureaucratized par excellence. But in the period prior to that, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, British colonial liberalism achieved selective urban inclusion and exclusion through political distortions:
a group’s say in municipal development and decisions was both tied to individuals’ wealth and property ownership and manipulated through a stereotyped discourse of clean/dirty.

The account of the 19th century’s uneven infrastructure development in Cape Town and the social and political struggles around it, resonates with many aspects of post-apartheid struggles. Understanding the space in Cape Town as socially and historically constituted, produced by the uneven and combined processes of capitalist development, contributes significantly to the analysis of contemporary urban redevelopment strategies there — the point to which I now turn.

**Part Two: 21st Century Post-apartheid Period**

The uneven spatial and infrastructure development that underlies the late 19th century’s urban conflicts described above is instrumental in understanding production of Cape Town as a capitalist city in its contemporary era. Undoubtedly the complex dynamics of the 20th century’s urbanization of the Cape Colony is critical to the formation of Cape Town as an apartheid city and hence its post-apartheid struggles for urban development and redevelopment today. However, in the interest of space, I refer the readers to the vast and eloquent literature that exists on the topic and move the discussion to the early 21st century which constitutes the direct point of comparison in this research.

In the passage that follows I focus on a specific urban redevelopment and governance strategy launched in Cape Town in 2000 called creation of City Improvement Districts (CIDs). CIDs facilitate booming real-estate and intense wealth accumulation through municipal legislation that moves the responsibility for location creation to the property owners’ decisions in neighborhood or district levels. CIDs also known by their legal name, Special Rate Areas (SRAs), are selected zones or districts within the city where property owners pay additional fees to access superior services from the municipality with respect to policing, cleaning and marketing.

Creation of CIDs in Cape Town business district or CBD in particular has brought wealth almost overnight to a few real estate capitalists holding property in almost the same historic quarters of the town discussed in the previous section (see maps 1 and 2). For example, in 2002 one property owner, Mr. Mark Tuckwell, bought three historic buildings in the old quarters of the Cape Town city center for R1.7 million. He put them up for sale within a year at R20m after converting them to a boutique hotel, luxury apartments and a restaurant/cocktail bar. Another example is Cape Town’s 19th century hub of elite mercantile capital which today includes streets such as Adderley, St. George’s, Short Market and Long Market streets. These are now home to the businesses headquarters of global firms as well as luxury residential real estate. The properties in these areas that were the main recipient of urban infrastructure improvements in the colonial era, are currently recipients of legislative municipal supports that can be
likened to opening of modern gold mines right down town. What land was to the white colonizers in the colonial era, real estate properties have been to national and foreign investors like Mark Tuckwell in the post-apartheid neoliberal era.

Figure 2. Cape Town Central City CIDs 2006. Source: Cape Town Partnership’s website http://capetownpartnership.co.za/ accessed August 1, 2011.


The creation of CID[s and SRAs in contemporary urban redevelopment and management are typically marketed as innovative and new but have deep colonial roots. Many aspects of their operating principles parallel those of the 19th century colonial municipal governance. The operating principles of the CID[s adopted not only in Cape Town but also in many cities around the world focus on two specific
aspects of this contemporary urban redevelopment strategy, namely political citizenship and discursive justification. As in the colonial era, the elites’ spatial interests were secured through regulatory means by making political citizenship contingent on wealth and property ownership, and through discursive means to justify creation of special location (call it districts or areas).

Creation of CIDs

Creation of Improvement Districts has advanced in Cape Town since 2000. This strategy was first marketed to the city authorities and to private business owners in Cape Town by an entrepreneur, Michael Faar, as a new strategy for urban business district redevelopment. Crediting New York City Rudy Giuliani and his success in ‘cleaning up’ New York City as an inspiration for what he claimed to be an innovation in urban redevelopment and management, Faar promoted the creation of CIDs as a means to fight ‘crime and grime,’ to bring in tourism, foreign investment and in short to turn Cape Town into ‘the Apple of Africa’— that is, a world class city (interview 2001). A stipulated in Municipal Property Rates Act (2004) the suburbs have also been able to create CIDs. Using the legal term Special Rate Areas their boundaries closely approximate the old apartheid fault-lines. As of July 2010 there were 23 CIDs in operation in the Cape Town metropolitan area and an additional 42 prospective CIDs or SRAs listed by the City. The total CID budget reached R83 million, with each District allocated between two and four million rand.

In the words of the CIDs promotional material a CID / SRA is “initiated by communities and not the city. . . . [It] refers to geographical areas . . . in which property owners can raise levies to fund additional services in their areas. . . . The purpose of residential property owners establishing an SRA in their suburb would be to enjoy a broader service than rendered by the city, . . . [it] entails a comprehensive business plan compiled by a steering committee, presented to the community in a public meeting and approved by majority vote. . . . Once written consent has been obtained from a majority of more than 50% of community members, the business plan, motivation report and implementation plan is presented to the city. . . . the city will not get involved in the daily running of it but will provide financial oversight and legal compliance. . . . The city will collect levies on behalf of SRAs. . . .” Extra property rates, usually adding some 10-30% to the standard rate, can only be used there.

It must be noted that in the creation of such locations, tenants, either (residential or commercial) have no say. The decision to join a district is made exclusively by the property owners. Once 50% +1 of the owners with more than half of the value of properties in an area adopt this strategy, all are subject to the additional fees. The zone has a private, nongovernmental governing entity to oversee the service delivery and to enforce bylaws about the zone’s use and the users of its public space. The Board of Directors for the managing body of the Improvement District comprises self-appointed members of the
The center city CID, for example, is directed by South African Property Owners Association, the City of Cape Town, provincial administration, the Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Business Against Crime.

CIDs create privileged urban districts, and have therefore galvanized contentious municipal politics, which at one point seemed to threaten the partnership that was established between the municipal government and the private entities for its management. At background to the CIDs, it is important to note that the post-apartheid Cape Town politics have been marked by tension between the African National Congress (ANC) controlled provincial government and the Democratic Alliance (DA) controlled City government. In 2004 at an interim moment when an ANC mayor, Nomaiindia Mfeketo, weighed in on city politics, she aligned herself with the citizens’ grievances against CIDs elitism which in its post-apartheid reincarnation was not based on race but on ability to pay rate. Mfeketo threatened withdrawal from the partnership that was headed by its Afrikaner founding director, Michael Faar, who was too untactful and insensitive to the post-apartheid political taste of the moment—some might say politically incorrect in his use of language and discursive representation. Faar was forced to step down and replaced by a charismatic former ANC activist, Andrew Boraine, who swiftly shifted the language of the CIDs publicity to make them pro-poor, and socially more sensitive and responsive to the political mood of the day. Boraine embarked on a massive media campaign which included a number of newspaper editorial entries that stressed how ‘being poor is not a crime’ and that CIDs did not intend whitening their districts. These efforts served to foil the main criticisms of the CIDs. In this rather politically volatile moment Mayor Mfeketo called a halt to the creation of CIDs in residential areas, arguing that it might open a flood gate for former white suburbs desiring to re-create their exclusive enclaves. This momentary political turmoil and realignment, however, didn’t last long. The residential CIDs were shortly thereafter approved and have since been growing rapidly in number.

The fight against crime looms large in creation of CIDs and SRAs. While the primary objective of the commercial CIDs is business improvement and creating spaces for unfettered consumption, the enhanced safety and security is always listed as the top strategy to achieve those objectives. In an editorial entitled ‘Citizen Kane’ determined to make city clean and safe,” the Sunday Times cites Robert Kane, the appointed chairman of the Central City Improvement District (CID), who credits the city center’s economic boost to ten years of CIDs operation and its fight against crime and grime. In Kane’s conception of the CID promotional discourse, poverty and crime are collapsed into a single category. In explaining the CCCID’s success Kane stresses one single campaign as the most effective one: the "give responsibly" campaign. “Leaflets are handed out at traffic lights asking drivers not to give money or food to beggars, but rather to give to one of the many city charities looking after
them, or to the night shelter which offers them a free roof over their heads. . . . You hardly ever see a street child in the city centre anymore,” explains Kane. “It's had a ‘dramatic’ effect on crime.”

Having equated presence of street kids with crime, when asked “What single improvement has bettered life in the Central City?” Kane responds “the emergence of our own Café society.”

The CCID annual report confirms his statement listing among other indicators of success “30% increase in number of coffee shops in central city from 2003-2010.”

Two often aspects of CIDs operation strikingly resemble those of the colonial era reviewed earlier. Firstly, the contingency of urban citizenship on wealth, whereby only property owners have a say; and, secondly discursive justification of exclusionary urban practices. While one relies on the discourse of sanitation and hygiene to justify elitist urban development the other relies on the discourse of safety and fight against crime. These aspects of contemporary urban governance and development when brought in dialogue with the colonial aspects discussed earlier, offer illuminating insights into the contemporary construction of urban privilege and its management.

1) Wealth Contingencies of Urban Citizenship

In South Africa’s post-apartheid era, constitutional reforms sought to erase ethnicity and race as markers of citizens’ position within the social hierarchy. At the same time, the CIDs have returned to an old colonial practice of the British. They tie political citizenship — the right to have a say in local (re)development decisions — to property ownership. To join a CID, only property owners in the proposed Improvement District can vote on whether to establish it.

In colonial Cape Town, setting the bar for political citizenship was a decisive step by the newly instituted municipal government, allocating the right to a voice in urban matters. Under the colonial era’s principles of liberalism the bar was movable, pushed ever higher by the elite and pulled lower by the common householder. By pushing the bar higher the elite were ensuring that their interests were served by municipal decisions especially about public works and other kinds of improvements.

The contemporary creation of Improvement Districts as zones of privilege in Cape Town mean the right to local decisions about development and governance is tied to property ownership—a condition with close affinity to the colonial practices. That familiar relationship gives the lie to claims of innovation by neoliberal approaches like New Public Management that have advocated CIDs as an innovative entrepreneurial solution to problems of urban management and redevelopment.

In short, neoliberal capitalism in the post-apartheid Cape Town translates the means for uneven urban governance and (re)development from the bureaucratic and racialized strategies of apartheid to the economic mechanisms, to achieve the same urban exclusion wielding wealth and the sanctity of property.
2) Safety is the New Sanitation

The discourse of sanitation and public hygiene that marked the colonial urban hegemony within liberalism reemerges in the discourse of crime and public safety for post-apartheid affluent groups within a neoliberal policy environment. The post-apartheid era has perforce abandoned the political use of ethnicized and racialized discourse as the means of enforcing urban exclusion. In its place, a discourse of public safety justifies those urban exclusions.

The promotion of CIDs/ SRAs relies heavily on the notion of safety. In the promotional material, social and physical sanitation are merged through the slogans such as “CIDs defeat crime and grime” or that “BIDs clean up!” These are accompanied by an image of waste collectors and police officers working hand-in-hand.104

In the early years of Cape Town’s CIDs this discursive merger had brutal social implications. Private waste collection contractors made their rounds during the day to pick up the District’s trash and then the private security forces made their rounds in the evening to clean up the District from perceived criminal elements, the street children and homeless. Under the aegis of police safety, CIDs made a concerted effort to socially sanitize the city center or indeed any Improvement District.105 Not only were children and the homeless removed, so were informal traders and street vendors. An informal public parking system was eliminated in favor of formalized parking attendants and privatized management. All were seen as interventions facilitated by the municipality’s partnership with local businesses to undertake a complete makeover of downtown to improve the real or perceived experience of safety. Improving safety in downtown was linked to economic prosperity: the highest guiding principle of a neoliberal policy framework.106

The discourse of public safety and crime prevention was also central to the justification of social exclusions that occurred with adoption of SRAs in residential areas. In a study of SRAs in Cape Town, Forslund found that seventy to eighty percent of the SRA-budgets in Cape Town were devoted to additional security and surveillance.107 A large number of Law Enforcement Officers, were trained by the City and licensed to make arrests. They were hired by SRAs to patrol their area only—an approach also refered to as “Rent-A-Cop”. According to a City official, Forslund wrote, many of these law enforcemnt officers or “cops for rent” would have been unemployed if it wasn’t for the SRAs.

The South African private security sector is one of the largest in the world, employing (formally) around 400,000 people.108 The state police force employs another 140 000. Indeed about 1 percent of the South African population is employed in the security business and in guarding private property.109 While
the employment in the country is in decline, the statistics of the last thirteen years indicate that employment by the private security business is a solid area of employment growth. (See Figure 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Active security officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>115331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>127604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>155818</td>
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<td>288686</td>
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<td>296901</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>397344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Registered Active Private Security Officers, 1997-2009


Much has been published on how rationales about crime further the construction of elitist exclusionary cities and citizenship. Caldeira eloquently exposes how the discourse of crime and the real or perceived fear of crime are used to privatize public space and erode the public realm. Given the historical analysis of how the original elitist and exclusionary urban development in Cape Town’s city
center used the discourse of sanitation to foster segregation, it prompts one to question the conjunction of the physical and social sanitation issues in the CIDs’ promotional literature. The contemporary conflation of ‘crime and grime’ to justify means for exclusionary urban governance has an extended historical pedigree. By making public hygiene and public safety interchangeable, urban strategies such as CIDs achieve a social cleansing of urban public spaces. The territorially bound development strategies of CIDs concentrate urban services and infrastructure improvements in selected zones. Their localized improvements and enforcements displace crime to areas that cannot afford to purchase additional police services, and eject street children and the homeless to other areas. The combined processes of selective inclusion and exclusion in the early 21st century continue the legacy of uneven urban development from the colonial era.

Just as the critique of the “Sanitation Syndrome” at the turn of the previous century was not to deny the scientific validity of disease and risk but to understand “the power of a metaphor to shape perceptions and influence or justify behaviour”¹¹¹ so the critique of “combating crime and grime” as the discursive engine of the elitist urban development at the turn of this century is not to deny existence of safety risk and high crime in the contemporary urban South Africa. It is rather to understand how the metaphor of “crime and grime” that associates crime and poverty plays a powerful role in justifying exclusionary and elitist strategies for city’s development and governance.

**Part Three: Colonial Present**

The dynamics of the social groups in the stories told here unfold the contentious colonial spatiality of Cape Town and the historical struggles that have shaped and been shaped by it. They bring to light the distinct yet similar processes by which the urban space and its development hierarchically (re)structure social relations based on class, race and ethnicity, in the two eras. They highlight three dimensions of the colonial development and governance of Cape Town that are closely echoed by its contemporary Improvement Districts: 1) uneven urban (re)development to privilege the interest of the elite and global capital; 2) political citizenship made contingent on property ownership and wealth to secure an exclusive urban development and governance; 3) use of discourse of sanitation and/or public safety to justify elitist urban development and governance.

The late 19th century colonial strategies and the early 21st century neoliberal strategies for an elitist urban (re)development resemble one another in several ways. Both privilege improvement of selected quarters of the city and promote territorially limited local development. They both privilege the city center or business district as the hub of foreign investment and global capital, at the expense of quarters of the city with less affluent businesses and residents. Both fantasize the metropole as the inspiration for their (re)development. While one declares success by announcing Cape Town as clean and
modern like London, the other claims success by declaring Cape Town to be a world class city like Giuliani’s New York City, or the ‘Apple of Africa.’ The discursive means are used in both eras for justification of elitist developments. While one relies on the ‘fight against disease,’ the other enrolls the ‘fight against crime’ as the main rationale for its elitist development decisions. In both eras creation of special locations or districts is used as a strategy to create urban privilege for some and exclusion for others. While in the colonial era ‘location creation’ segregated those at the bottom of the social hierarchy (the non-Europeans) as cheap labor reservoirs (in its apartheid reiteration referred to as homelands); in the post-apartheid neoliberal era Improvement Districts create special locations for those higher up in the social hierarchy of the city. The latter creates special locations for the affluent as spaces of consumption. Moreover, in its neoliberal post-apartheid version, segregation in Improvement Districts and SRAs is through seemingly voluntary community-based decisions justified discursively as means of exercising citizens’ choice in realizing their wish to ‘combat crime and grime.’

Pointing at the similarities and differences in simultaneous production of urban privilege and disadvantage in the city through urban infrastructure investment, or lack thereof, across the two eras is not to imply that history repeats. The creation of elitist exclusionary urbanism is the ultimate objective of urban governance in both eras but their means for achieving this end differ. An important characteristic of neoliberalism lies in its illusive notion of participatory and inclusive governance. In the neoliberal era the illusion is that the citizens have exercised choice and participated in making decisions that bind. Neoliberal governance implies inclusion, a process of governance whereby decisions are arrived at by citizens and residents’ consent. A case in point is the attachment of vote or political voice to wealth. In the colonial era the elite through the municipal council determined how high the citizenship bar should be set to include and exclude common or disadvantaged urban householders’ voice in decisions. The process of governance involved decrees that were determined from above and applied across the city. Today, however, under the neoliberal ‘sanctity of choice,’ urban citizenship is fragmented and is tied to ‘choices’ communities make. Here the justification is that the citizens in an Improvement District have exercised their right to be able to pay more and receive more—they have exercised their right to have a choice. The inequality and privilege therefore is produced in this neoliberal scenario through creation of zones, and the fragmentation of urban experience that is presented as an outcome of democratic and inclusive governance—a process that respects citizens’ right to determine the kind of urban experience they choose for themselves and their families. This is distinct from the top down bureaucratic creation of locations in the earlier era.

I have elsewhere discussed elusive inclusion as a key characteristic of the contemporary neoliberal urban governance.112 There is a wealth of literature that discusses the fragmentation of urban
experience as a characteristic of the neoliberal urbanism, e.g. by splintering urban experience through urban infrastructure development, or by participatory governance which symbolically includes the poor but materially excludes their interests. Jessop and Hart, for example, write about the success of neoliberalism in “naturalizing” its policies. For that to happen Jessop argues neoliberalism relies on new discourses and new subjectivities that establish “the legitimacy of the market economy, the disciplinary state, and enterprise culture.” While neoliberalism as a political project, seeks to roll back ‘normal’ (or routine) forms of state intervention it selectively transfers state capacities “upwards, downwards, and sideways.” In the historical case study of Cape Town creating CIDs or SRAs is a clear example of moving the state’s role downward by moving the decision for urban infrastructure from city council to neighborhoods, specifically to the affluent property owners within the neighborhood. Here the municipality does not have to take responsibility for production of privilege. Unlike its nineteenth century counterpart the city council does not need to vote for the higher level of sanitation development in one district over the other. It rather makes the colonial practices an ‘option’ available to specific communities, call it districts, within the city. The state therefore can protect itself in the guise of democratic decisions made by citizens.

The connections this essay highlight between the contemporary neoliberal strategies for urban governance and the colonial practices of governance during the past century has conceptual and practical significance. Conceptually, shedding light on the colonial legacies of contemporary urban policies contributes to a better understanding of neoliberalism and its genealogy. It suggests that the contemporary neoliberal urban policies emerge from the paradox of liberalism that was first experienced in the colonies. In that sense neoliberal urban policies may be presented as ‘the colonial chickens coming home to roost!’ This insight helps to debunk the common misconception about neoliberal policies as innovations conceived in the 1970s and 1980s in the global North and rolled out to the rest of the world through institutional means of the Washington Consensus. The historicized perspective presented here illuminates the contemporary global neoliberal policies not as linear one-way policy formations. The similarities and continuities observed in urban practices of the 19th and 21st century Cape Town and those of the late 20th century New York, for example, suggest the inadequacy in presenting and conceptualizing the contemporary CIDs as a mere ‘copy’ of New York’s BIDs. In this case the resemblance in strategies used in production and management of the uneven development of Cape Town during the colonial and neoliberal eras challenge the argument that creation of Improvement Districts is a noble idea and an ‘innovation’ in urban management conceived in the global north. It reveals the truly transnational flows that shape contemporary neoliberalism through complex spatialities and temporalities that aim to resolve the paradox of liberalism.
On a practical level, the insights this historical analysis offers has important implications for anti-elitist struggles waged by the urban poor in neoliberal cities. An important force in globalizing CIDFs and other means of capitalist urban redevelopment and management has been the packaging of these strategies as innovative, cutting edge inventions in urban governance and management (eg New Public Management). In the words of Gillian Hart “what is important about in-depth historical geographies and ethnographies grounded in relational conceptions of the production of space is their capacity to illuminate constitutive processes and interconnections, and thereby contribute to the production of concrete concepts” and shape knowledges that disrupt “situated ignorances and forgettings.”). Revealing the continuities and similarities in elitist urban strategies used across the colonial and the post-apartheid eras can give more force to the contemporary oppositional movements that fight against urban exclusion. By challenging the claims of innovation, an historicized critical perspective offers forceful resistance to the displacing, alienating, and marginalizing policies that are justified as ‘innovative solutions’ to contemporary urban problems.

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Historical reflections for insurgent planning practices

Urban planning’s commitment to creating a future has often come at the expense of looking at the past. We have been so focused on planning for the future that we have forgotten to take a good look at the past and recognize the histories that have shaped the present and influenced the future. It is such a look at the past that I attempted above. The dynamics of these social groups and the stories told above illuminate the contentious spatiality of Cape Town and the historical struggles that have shaped and been shaped by it. They bring to light the distinct yet similar processes by which the development of urban space hierarchically structures and restructures social relations based on class, race, and ethnicity.

This history highlights three dimensions of the colonial development and governance of Cape Town that is closely echoed by contemporary improvement districts. First, uneven urban development privileges the interests of certain groups and areas in the city. Second, political citizenship is made contingent on property ownership. In the colonial era only the property owners could vote and have political rights to citizenship. Similarly, the governance and creation of improvement districts confers the right to vote only to property-owners not commercial or residential tenants. Finally, in both the colonial and post-Apartheid eras the use of discourse was fundamental.

While the discourse of sanitation was used in the colonial period to justify exclusionary developments, the use of the discourse of security has been used in contemporary Cape Town to justify exclusionary urban redevelopment policies. In both eras we find the creation of a location: while colonial practices segregated indigenous populations and created locations for blacks, in the contemporary period redevelopment policies created locations for affluent populations.
Improvement districts have been developed for those who can afford to be part of these special zones and benefit from greater cleaning, security, and services.

I am not implying, however, that history repeats itself or that contemporary neoliberal urban governance is the same as its colonial version. Both modes of governance have affinities, alarming parallels, but it is important to understand that they also have their own differences. The illusion of the neoliberal era is that citizens exercise choice and participate in decisions that bind them. Neoliberal governance establishes processes of inclusion whereby decisions are arrived at through the consent of citizens. When the city establishes a 51% majority vote for property owners it is honoring the neoliberal sanctity of choice for urban citizenship. Unlike the colonial municipality which created locations through decrees, the neoliberal government honors the possibility for this 51% to choose to pay more and create an improvement district. The colonial administration decided who was a property owner, which properties were valid and who were allowed to have a voice. The contemporary administration establishes a 51% threshold honoring everybody’s—or more exactly property owners’—choice. There key difference of these strategies of urban governance is the sanctity of choice.

Gillian Hart, for example, writes about the success of neoliberalism in naturalizing its policies. For that to happen, neoliberalism relies on new discourses and new subjectivities that establish the legitimacy of the market economy, the disciplinary state of enterprise culture. While neoliberalism as a political project seeks to roll back routine forms of state intervention, it also selectively transfers state capacities upward, downward and sideways. In the historical case of Cape Town, for example, the creation of improvement districts is a clear example of moving the state’s role downward, to the neighborhood level. It entailed moving decisions for urban infrastructure and development from the city administration to neighborhood districts so the city did not have to make those decisions for neighborhoods any longer.

The conceptual implication of this insight is important. Neoliberalism has often been discussed as a set of policies that was initiated in Washington D.C through the World Bank and other institutions of Washington consensus and then rolled out globally to city and national governments throughout the world. In my analysis I challenge this argument that what Giuliani did in New York City or what the Washington consensus formulated was then rolled out to other cities around the work. Instead, I show how it is actually the very colonial practices that the global south was subjected that are now going back to the global north and being implemented in places like New York. One could say, therefore, that these are the colonial chickens coming home to roost. The neoliberal policies that are being adopted in the global north are the very policies that the colonies were subjected to and which now are being circulated back to the north. This complicates the idea that cycles of policy transfer are a one-way road from the north that basically radiates out to the rest of the world. Rather, what comes into view is the back and forth movement of these policies through their many transnational rounds and circulations.

And it is important to understand these previous rounds of policy circulation, that is, to develop a conceptual understanding of the roots of neoliberal policies. It has practical importance because it takes away that edge that neoliberal policies have claimed for themselves as being new, as being innovative. Returning to Michael Farr, the character I referred to who went to a mayor’s conference, met Giuliani, and went back to South Africa and convinced city officials and other
actors to embark on the redevelopment partnership. The winning ticket for his move was that the policy was a cutting-edge innovation, the newest strategy that citizens in the United States and elsewhere were implementing. The ticket of innovation that new public management often claims is what has basically made many mayors, municipal governments, and other actors buy into neoliberal policies. Once this claim of newness is destabilized and its colonial roots exposed, anti-elitist movements will have a more powerful means to resist and challenge exclusionary redevelopment programs.

Milan Kundera, the Czechoslovakian author, writes that the struggle against power is the struggle between forgetting and remembering. I believe the problem with much urban analysis in the contemporary era is that it submits to a kind of amnesia. In this fight between forgetting and remembering, often forgetting has been on the winning side. It is crucial for insurgent planning, for insurgent citizenship, and for insurgent practices that try to resist exclusion, to bring back the historical, the collective memories of people in that fight between forgetting and remembering.

I want to end by going into the implications of these insights for insurgent practices of citizenship that fight for justice and inclusion and which I have also referred to as insurgent planning practices. First, they are transgressive in time and space. In this sense, it is very important that we historicize any urban problem, program and project. By historicizing it we are not only exposing the roots of what is claimed to be innovative but we are also transgressing time, which is very important in order to achieve a deeper perspective. Transgressing space by looking at experiences in other places is also crucial to the formation of transnational solidarities among urban populations that are involved in similar struggles against exclusion.

Second, insurgent practices are counter-hegemonic and destabilizing. Such practices destabilize normalized relations of dominance and insist on citizens’ right to the dissent, to determine their own terms of engagement and participation. In this sense, the most important objective of counter-hegemonic planning practices should be to re-politicize urban development. Bringing back the question of power should be at the core of any debate on new ways of carrying out urban renewal. We cannot “renew urban renewal” and avoid the old ways in which urban renewal was done if we do not bring back the political, the notions of power and politics, to ask who are the winners and who are the losers in any given urban intervention.

Planning claims certain neutrality that often times actually translates into siding with privileged groups. When political discourses say they are for re-distribution, they are actually often for re-distribution among the wealthy. This is why the question of politics and power must be brought up and exposed: What are planners’ political aims in terms of power alliances? Who are the winners and loser in their schemes? If we just try to avoid that question by saying that what we do is not political, that it is power-neutral, we basically allow those with a privileged position to determine the direction of our projects. This is particularly problematic in hierarchical societies, where socio-economic and political powers are deeply entrenched. This must be part of the approach to move forward within new ways of looking at urban renewal.

It is extremely important to a look at power dynamics within partnerships such as the ones we saw in Cape Town. Power imbalances between the public and private sectors can mean that
private actors often take over the interests of the partnership and the public sector becomes a passive participant; this is what happened to a certain degree in the Cape Town partnership. Finally, it is equally important to recover the idealism of planning, the imagination that a different form of urban development and redevelopment is possible. This conference is in many ways a beginning in that attempt. The sense that there is no alternative has been powerful and people have often accepted the status quo because of the idea that there is no possibility for doing things differently. I believe that being able to imagine a different route is really important for the possibility of reaching a different urban renewal or redevelopment.

Decolonizing planning thought means not looking necessarily to the global north for solutions. We can take lessons from other experiences but they always have to be rooted in our own historical making. What happened in Cape Town is that people allowed their imagination to be captured. In the post-Apartheid era of the mid-1990s delegates of planners were traveling and being wined and dined by institutions in the global north, by powerful institutions. When they returned to South Africa they thought they had picked up one of these readymade solutions or best practices off the shelf, what we could call ‘fast policies’. This momentarily suppressed the imagination of new possibilities and the hopeful moments of post-Apartheid planning when the world was looking to South Africa for remedies to social injustice through inclusive forms of urban development and rights to citizenship.

The good news, however, is that in South Africa many strong social movements have come into the scene, populations disillusioned with the remedies of global north. These new actors are looking inward and alliances are being formed among social movements, progressive planners, and city officials who want to create new ways to deal with historically rooted uneven developments and inequalities. So the future is still ahead of us and the struggle continues.

**Concluding remarks: challenges of critical urban redevelopment**

I hope these insights contribute to ongoing discussions about new ways to carry out urban renewal and, in particular, to recognize the larger forces that should be taken into account in redevelopment processes. I will conclude with some reflections on the project Progresa Fenicia of the Universidad de los Andes, which has opened a space to reflect on contemporary urban renewal and hopefully to take a critical stand on such processes that will allow more just outcomes.

Fenicia’s redevelopment is a complex project. The neighborhood’s local residents have diverse interests but they are not organized around their interests and needs. There is a troubled history in abuse of community participation by city authorities. There is a concentrated pocket of young population with cash in their hands for effective consumption in the local area. There are developers with a strong real estate and commercial interest to capitalize in the redevelopment of the area with a large margin of profit. And, finally, there is the Fenicia project team, who represents the university as yet another giant force in this development. The university is indeed a double headed giant since it counts both as the local community with interests rooted in the locality (territorial long terms belonging) and as the financial developer (funding for example the Fenicia project as the research and design portion of the development project) as well as leasee and lesauer for many of the properties in the area.
The Progresa Fenicia project embodies a difficult case in that residents are not vibrant, firing, organized groups, which are able to articulate their diverse interests and fears vis-a-vis interests of the private sector, the university and the city authorities— at least not yet. Moreover, what is most worrisome that at the moment the role and interests of the private sector developers has not been brought to the table for discussion nor charted out in project's development scheme. The project cannot be drafted in absence of accounting for developers and their interests, which are often in opposition to the wellbeing of the community. Fenicia cannot be created as a plan that is agreed upon by the university and the residents alone, and then only later having the private developers brought in. My fear is that the university will reach an agreement with the residents and a legitimized plan will be drafted through the hard work the team and the community put into the project to do renewal differently. But if there is no engagement with the interest of real estate capital in this project early on, the project might just clear the path for them to come into the project at a later stage and harvest their profit through the legitimated plan the university has created with the residents.

In dealing with developers and setting the rules of the game the university has more power now than later. The university can play the role of residents’ advocate and set up certain rules for developers' participation in the project. For this renewal project to really be different there has to be a business model that is unique and based on the dynamics of the local context. The danger is that developers will pile the residents on top of each other in residential towers; clear the land and offer the university's 15% expansion share; leave some land for the parks, roads, and public access as the plan calls for; but take over a good share of the land and open it to national and international bids by commercial investors. The investors will make a killing by opening their malls in this pocket of concentrated youth with an effective purchasing power much higher than the other areas in the surrounding. Their chain stores and multinational franchises will no doubt kill the possibility of continued livelihood for local stores-a process that gradually uproots and dislocates the residents.

The scenario does not have to or need to have such bleak future. The project could create an alternative business model to prevent this. By business model I mean the project team and residents have much more power now to show teeth and flex muscle in negotiation with the private sector regarding the share of the pie the developers can claim for their participation. The university can at this point make an important list of contingencies that can later save the project from hurting the local residents. I am afraid that if university and community actors do not look eye to eye with business interests of private sector developers and set up the rules of the game now, later might be too late.

Endnotes


10 Metropole refers to the region that benefits from the exploitation of its colony.


Commissioners in Cape Town were much more than their British counterpart. In England of 1835 town council was Wardmasters kept track of who lives where and what they earn or own. Responsibilities of municipal officials quarters since 1793 producing municipal committees and burgher senates (ibid.: xviii). Wardmasters were elected by householders and landlords. Commissioners were appointed by governor, colonial administration and development. London: Methuen & Co., 1895: 251). By 1830 population of the Cape colony raised to 150,000 (Robert Ross, “The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835” in The Shaping of South African Society, 1865-1840, eds. Elphick, Richard and Hermann Giliomee (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 244-245). Cape Town also experienced similar population growth, while in 1842 as a whole the city had 22,000 population, by 1865 its municipal area had reached 29,368 in population (see Digby Warren and M. Broodryk, Merchants, Commissioners, and Wardmasters: Municipal and Colonial Politics in Cape Town, 1840-1854, Volume 55 of Archives year book for South African history (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1992 : xxv). This number grew to 33,239 in 1875; to 51,251 in 1891; to 77,608 in 1904. This population boom is also reflected in number of houses in Cape Town growing from 4,132 in 1875; to 7,608 in 1891; and to 9,808 in 1904. In this period the municipal revenues also grew from £37,000 in 1880 to £184,662 in 1898 (see Bickford-Smith 1983:6-7 note 3).


By 1850 the city started to see some improvements such as keeping of the streets, covering some of the pen canals. While St George and Aderley street had gas lamps in 1847, lighting of main roads in the city center started later in 1869.

Municipal responsibilities at this time seem to have included the following areas: fire fighting; water; gas lighting; town carts for trash; watchmen, and half of police cost (see Warren and Broodryk 1992 note 24).

Ordinance No 9 1836 mandated the creation of municipal Boards in towns and villages of the Colony; Ordinance No 3, 1839 mandated the creation of municipal Boards in Cape Town (Warren and Broodryk 1992:49 note 24). Ordinance of 1836 permitted towns that so desired to establish elected municipal boards, was no startling innovation. The small boards of local people assisted by Wardmasters had persisted both in Dutch and British official quarters since 1793 producing municipal committees and burguber senates (ibid.: xviii).

Wardmasters were elected by householders and landlords. Commissioners were appointed by governor, colonial officers and hence were oriented to the interest of the British but Wardmasters were oriented to the interest of the locals. Commissioners were mostly among elite mercantile class many British who came to the Cape Colony to make money and leave (see Warren and Broodryk 1992 note 24). The conflict between Wardmasters and Commissioners was also characterized as conflict between local and landed versus trade and global capital.

Digby Warren and M. Broodryk, Merchants, Commissioners, and Wardmasters: Municipal and Colonial Politics in Cape Town, 1840-1854, Volume 55 of Archives year book for South African history (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1992), 78. In relation to Wardmasters, Commissioners had the upper hand. They drew up the regulations that were submitted to Wardmasters for approval. Wardmasters in return served as watchdogs. They had to audit commissioners’ accounts and budget and finances (ibid., xxvi). While Commissioners were unpaid, Wardmasters were paid for collecting fees from residents and registering and recording inhabitants and dwellings. Wardmasters kept track of who lives where and what they earn or own. Responsibilities of municipal Commissioners in Cape Town were much more than their British counterpart. In England of 1835 town council was much more than their British counterpart. In England of 1835 town council was much more than their British counterpart. In England of 1835 town council was much more than their British counterpart. In England of 1835 town council was much more than their British counterpart. In England of 1835 town council was much more than their British counterpart.

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21 Records show that by 1808 there were 7000 free slaves (prized Negros) and 9000 slaves in Cape Town (Bickford-Smith, 1983 see note 3).


23 According to Robert Ross, “The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835” in The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840, eds. Elphick, Richard and Hermann Giliomee (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 244-245, Cape colony of 1700 was minuscule having 2000 people and 70 houses. By 1806 population of cape colony had reached 73,663, of whom 26,720 were of European descent (William Worsfold, South Africa: A Study in colonial administration and development. London: Methuen & Co., 1895: 251). By 1830 population of the Cape colony raised to 150,000 (Robert Ross, “The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835” in The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840, eds. Elphick, Richard and Hermann Giliomee (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 244-245). Cape Town also experienced similar population growth, while in 1842 as a whole the city had 22,000 population, by 1865 its municipal area had reached 29,368 in population (see Digby Warren and M. Broodryk, Merchants, Commissioners, and Wardmasters: Municipal and Colonial Politics in Cape Town, 1840-1854, Volume 55 of Archives year book for South African history (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1992 : xxv). This number grew to 33,239 in 1875; to 51,251 in 1891; to 77,608 in 1904. This population boom is also reflected in number of houses in Cape Town growing from 4,132 in 1875; to 7,608 in 1891; and to 9,808 in 1904. In this period the municipal revenues also grew from £37,000 in 1880 to £184,662 in 1898 (see Bickford-Smith 1983:6-7 note 3).


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29 Digby Warren and M. Broodryk, Merchants, Commissioners, and Wardmasters: Municipal and Colonial Politics in Cape Town, 1840-1854, Volume 55 of Archives year book for South African history (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1992), 78. In relation to Wardmasters, Commissioners had the upper hand. They drew up the regulations that were submitted to Wardmasters for approval. Wardmasters in return served as watchdogs. They had to audit commissioners’ accounts and budget and finances (ibid., xxvi). While Commissioners were unpaid, Wardmasters were paid for collecting fees from residents and registering and recording inhabitants and dwellings. Wardmasters kept track of who lives where and what they earn or own. Responsibilities of municipal Commissioners in Cape Town were much more than their British counterpart. In England of 1835 town council was much more than their British counterpart.
only in charge of police force (ibid., xxvi). In Cape Town the 1836 Cape Ordinance empowered commissioners to: appoint street watchmen; provide fire engine; erect lamp posts; lay water pipes; erect bridges; reservoirs and fountains; keep streets in good repair, to establish market; to enforce regulations on weight and measures to enter into contracts for public works; to dispose of municipal property and abate public nuisance. In Cape Town in addition to these the commissioners were also in charge of controlling the quality of bread and meat. But police force fell under the colonial administration.


31 During 1843, 1844 in conflicts that arose between Wardmasters and commissioners, usually commissioners would get their way in fund allocation: a trend that Wardmasters detested as way putting “municipal purse at the uncontrolled disposal of the commissioners and commissioners blamed on Wardmasters apathy reflected in Wardmasters’ the poor attendance in their Board meetings. The problem of Wardmasters attendance was however partly solved in 1848 by lowering the quorum to half (Warren and Broodryk 1992: 79 see note 24).


33 Commissioners like Jacob Letterstedt, and elite merchant, were influential in such decisions. For example it was after his visit to Europe inspired by Amsterdam and Stockholm modern style of stone paving that Shortmarket street in center city was stone paved (Bickford-Smith, 1983: 87-88, see note 3).


36 Ibid., 78.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 77. In 1844, for example, they protested against provision of gas lighting for the Heerengracht canal, as it benefited primarily the merchants and elite, but failed to benefit the areas of the periphery where their constituency was affected (Warren and Broodryk 1992: 77, see note 24).

39 See ibid., 50-56.

40 Ibid., 50-54 and 1-2.

41 Ibid.: 56

42 Ibid.: 54; chapter 5.

43 Ibid., 59. Colonial government expecting exemption from fees threatened that “Royal prerogative, might interpose an insuperable bar” to the power of any municipality acting under a local ordinance to tax crown property. But undeterred the Wardmasters and Commissioners passed resolution (Ordinance No 4 of 1842) and kept their taxation of colonial government like that of private property. Ibid., 56.

44 Ibid., 81.

45 Warren and Broodryk also believe the early 1840s heated conflicts between the two Boards started to subside after 1844 partly because of the lowering the Wardmasters quorum. Ordinance 14 of 1848 that halved the number of Wardmasters from 96 to 48, contributed to easing the conflicts that mostly arose from poor Wardmaster’s
attendance and inability of their Board to reach a viable quorum to influence municipal expenditure decisions (ibid., 79-80).

46 Ibid., chapter 6.
47 Ibid., 121.
48 Ibid., 135.
49 Ibid.: 126.


51 Vivian Bickford-Smith “‘Keeping Your Own Council’ The Struggle Between House Owners and Merchants for Control of the Cape Town Municipal Council in the Last Two Decades of the Nineteenth Century,” (Cape Town: UCT Center or African Studies, 1983), 6.

52 For details see ibid., 6.


54 Ibid., 16.

55 Vivian Bickford-Smith, “‘Keeping Your Own Council’ The Struggle Between House Owners and Merchants for Control of the Cape Town Municipal Council in the Last Two Decades of the Nineteenth Century,” (Cape Town: UCT Center or African Studies, 1983), 20.

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 24.
58 Ibid., 22.
59 Ibid., 22.


63 Vivian Bickford-Smith, “‘Keeping Your Own Council’ The Struggle Between House Owners and Merchants for Control of the Cape Town Municipal Council in the Last Two Decades of the Nineteenth Century,” (Cape Town: UCT Center or African Studies, 1983), 10.

64 Vivian Bickford-Smith, “‘Keeping Your Own Council’ The Struggle Between House Owners and Merchants for Control of the Cape Town Municipal Council in the Last Two Decades of the Nineteenth Century,” (Cape Town: UCT Center or African Studies, 1983), 14. The Municipal Act of 1861 required supply of minimum 50 gallons of water per day per household “as soon and as far as practicable” (Bickford-Smith 1983: 4, 5, see note 3). The continued growth of population and city resulted in water shortage in 1872. With the 1872 reconstitution of local state as a responsible government including a Legislative Council and a House of Assembly (Bickford-Smith 1995, see note 3) the first private contract for water was granted by the municipal Board in 1877 (Bickford-Smith 1983, see note 3).

65 Vivian Bickford-Smith, “‘Keeping Your Own Council’ The Struggle Between House Owners and Merchants for Control of the Cape Town Municipal Council in the Last Two Decades of the Nineteenth Century,” (Cape Town: UCT Center or African Studies, 1983), 10.
Afrikaner and British whites, the competing European colonizers in the Cape, though potentially divided by language and origin, had been united in the past decade by being as the dominant class and by opposing the colonial government. But their temporary unity broke in the late 19th century after the urban boom in Cape Town and the conflicts it generated over sanitation development. Through those conflicts, Afrikaner and British whites were hierarchically ethicized (Bickford-Smith 1995: 37, see note 3). Afrikaner whites who resisted the sanitary reform as proposed by the British mercantile elite were labeled the Dirty Party. They were constructed not only as dirty and backward, but also as inferior by association with the middle class and small landlords, many of whom were Malays (Bickford-Smith 1995a: 49, see note 3). Afrikaner whites were thus put together with Moslems; the British accused them of opposing sanitary reform in return for Malay votes (Bickford-Smith 1995a: 50 and 57, see note 3). Afrikans became the language of the poor (black or white) as the British consolidated their superior ethnic identity. To be able to join the city’s elite, which was now identified as the white British bourgeoisie, some Dutch and Afrikanders who became wealthy then left the Dirty Party. They joined the Clean Party and Anglicanized (Bickford-Smith 1995a, see note 3).


Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 397.

Ibid., 410.

Indeed creation of an overall pass system that was enforced beyond locations or municipalities was advocated by Dr A. John Gregory, Medical Officer of Health for the Cape Colony, the medical officer for the Cape who proposed the comprehensive pass system applied to whole districts beyond municipalities and their locations.

Indeed as the comparative work by Odile Goerg, “From Hill Station (Freetown) to Downtown Conakry: Comparing French and British Approaches to Segregation in Colonial Cities at the Beginning of the Twentieth
Century,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 32, no. 1 (1998): 1-31, reveals both the French and English used the hygiene paradigm to enforce a clear division between so-called races and ethnic groups and to make these categories visible in everyday life.


87 Ibid.

88 In 1901 docks location was established for dock workers. Bickford-Smith (1995b, see note 3) argues that segregation was also a response to economic boom in Cape Town after the diamond discovery. Like Buenos Aires, he argues it is during the economic boom and expansion that there is a possibility of blacks prosperity. Four decades after freedoms of slaves in CT, the change was slow. But with the economic boom, there was need for more labor, hence more Africans in town and potentially the way was open for blacks prosperity and claim to admission to upper caste, but de facto this was hard as some jobs were restricted to whites.

90 Indeed in the first three years of its operation in Cape Town’s business district (2000 to 2003), CIDs were credited with bringing in new investments to the area that had an accumulated value of R8.2 bl or US$1.6 bn (The Saturday Argus July 5, 2003). Based on the exchange rate in July 2004, US$1=R5. In 2003 alone this investment was R3.4 billion. http://www.capetownpartnership.co.za.

91 The Saturday Argus July 5, 2003

92 SRAs are governed by the Municipal Property Rates Act, the Municipal Finance Management Act, Section 21 of the Companies Act, the SA Constitution and the city of Cape Town's Improvement District By Law of 2004.


94 Ibid.


96 I discuss the intricacies of this conflict in my 2007 article and refer the readers to that publication for additional detailed information.

97 The DA is a coalition party bringing together several parties that led the whites during apartheid. The alliance is in opposition to ANC the party that led the anti-apartheid movement and helped release and election of Nelson Mandela to presidency in 1994.

98 Not that an ANC controlled city council would not support CIDs in commercial or residential areas. Johannesburg the stronghold of ANC government at all levels has been indeed the first city to adopt CIDs.

99 In his hawkish entrepreneurial style Faar regularly took credit for the economic boom of the CBD and scorned the City for “incompetence.” With the real estate boom in the CBD he also gained unaccountable political power, where some referred to him as the “unofficial mayor of Cape Town.” Resentment of Faar built up within the city council when power in the City government shifted from the DA to the ANC, and his openly exclusionist remarks and critique of the City government made the newly ANC dominated city government vulnerable.

100 In 2002 of the R 50 million the Central City Improvement District had spent on improving the city centre, R6.7 million was spent on deployment of extra (166) police officers in the CBD (Sunday Times, November 3, 2002 page 17).

Ibid.


“Ibid.


Helen Zille, the Premier of the Western Cape for example in praising the CCID stresses the invaluable role it has played to reduce crime in the Cape Town Central City. “The Cape Town CBD was at risk of becoming a no-go area, especially at night and over weekends, as Capetonians stayed away because of mugging and other crime. This also posed a serious threat to our burgeoning tourism sector, which forms a valuable part of our economy. As a result of the work done by the Cape Town Partnership and the CCID, the Central City is once again a thriving economic, social and cultural centre.”

Dick Forslund “Special Rates Driving Wedges into City,” *Cape Times*, September 7, 2010, page 8. For example, in the statement of goals and objectives for adoption of SRA by a predominantly white affluent suburb, the Zeekoevlei Peninsula (ZVP), five specific goals with their respective budget allocation are listed. These include Safety & Security (R364,273.00); Effective Management of the SRA (R1,264.00); Cleanliness and Maintenance (R1,000); Environmental and Societal improvements (R0.00); and Effective Marketing of the scheme to involved residents (R4,285.00). 98 percent of the ZVPSRA total first year budget is allocated for safety to deploy contracted security guards that provide “a comprehensive security service on a 24/7 basis for the protection of residents and the public spaces of the Zeekoevlei Peninsula” (“Business Plan for the Management of the Zeekoevlei Peninsula Special Rating Area ( ZVPSRA): 01 July 2010 – 30 June 2015,” *ZVPSRA Business Plan*, 2010.)


Ibid.


Ibid., 454.

120 Ibid., 678.