Chapter 38
Planning and Citizenship
FARANAK MIRAFTAB

Citizenship is a contested and old notion, dating to the ancient Greeks and Romans, whose meaning has shifted across different eras and contexts. In its modern conceptualization, citizenship marks the rights, expectations, and responsibilities associated with membership in a political community framed by the nation-state. Citizenship catalyzes debates on important questions that mediate the relationship between the state and citizens: What are the rights of citizens (in civil, political, and socioeconomic terms)? How are those rights fulfilled (through legal and extra-legal, formal and informal means)? Whose responsibility is it to fulfill those rights (individual citizens, private- and public-sector organizations and institutions)?

These questions critical to the creation and maintenance of the modern state also are significant for planning, defined here as a field of action. A key function of the planning profession is mediation between conflicting needs and between the competing claims placed on society’s natural, social, and economic resources. Traditionally, the state, moderating among actors with competing agendas, has been the primary employer of planning professionals. Whether to achieve colonization, development, modernization, or neoliberalization, the state has relied on planners’ technical and discursive skills. In the last three decades, however, with the demise of the developmental state in the Global South and the welfare state in the Global North, there have been profound shifts in the definition of the state’s responsibilities and obligations vis-à-vis the citizens. The state’s role has been reconfigured as many of its responsibilities have been shifted to its citizens, to civic...
organizations, and to private businesses. Planners now lend their technical and discursive abilities to a broader range of actors beyond the state.

The shifts in relationships between state, civil society, and capital that have revived debates on citizenship also have important implications for planning praxis. The questions before us in this chapter are: How do planning theory and practice articulate with the project of citizenship? How does planning respond to the shifting conceptualization of citizenship and state–citizen relations? The chapter traces the shifts in conceptualizations of citizenship and the relevant shifts in the conceptualization of planning, particularly progressive planning. I argue that the goals and objectives of planning practice are complicated by their formulation on a contested terrain of citizenship. As progressive planning aims to achieve a just society (see Fainstein 2010), it is essential for it to engage with the expanded focus of the citizenship debate, from formal rights to justice and from representative to participatory democracy.

That engagement should lead progressive planners to recognize and reflect on certain nuanced differences between participatory planning and insurgent planning. Whereas participatory planning enlists citizens to participate in decisions through professional planners and formalized, often bureaucratized, structures of participation, “insurgent” planning occurs when citizens act directly through self-determined oppositional practices that constitute and claim urban spaces. Insurgent planning is a contested field of interaction among multiple actors including, but not confined to, professional planners, who determine the arenas of action to address the specific forms of oppression.

1. Citizenship Debates

Cities and citizenship are intricately connected. For the ancient Greeks and Romans, citizens were privileged free men who lived in the protected city; subjects were slaves who worked the land outside the city and its forts. The city protected citizens against aggressors and the
wars that took defeated populations as slaves. City citizenship then was a marker of privileged membership in a political community, the *polis*.

Ever since the classical period, the privileges associated with citizenship have been the subject of important political and philosophical debates. These fiercely contested debates have sought to (re)define the meanings and privileges attached to citizenship both in theory and in practice. The contemporary debate on citizenship engages with the liberal democratic notions shaped during the modern era to transform historical social hierarchies. The eighteenth-century revolutions, in particular the French Revolution, mark an important point of departure for the ensuing citizenship debates in Western liberal democracies. The motto “Liberty, equality, fraternity” for all asserted a universal but individualized ideal of citizenship. Societies were to be ruled not by allegiance to kings and feudal lords but by social contracts that sovereign and rational citizens made, exchanging individual freedom to a state in exchange for representation and equal treatment before the law (Rousseau 1762/1968). This modern construction of citizenship as a social contract that mediates between individual citizens and the state departs in important ways from the earlier notions. It is the nation, as opposed to the city, that defines citizens’ privileged membership in a political community whose populace is ruled as equals with political rights and duties.

The modern era’s notion of citizenship canceled the old hierarchies that subordinated subjects to citizens; yet it created new social hierarchies that draw much of the contemporary critique of liberal citizenship. Perhaps the best summary of the principles that guide liberal democratic citizenship is carried out by T. H. Marshall. In his often-quoted essay on citizenship and social class, he defines citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (1950/1977, 92). He divides citizenship rights into three categories of civil, political, and social rights, which he describes as arising in sequence
from the eighteenth to the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The eighteenth century was
preoccupied with citizens’ civil rights and with creating courts that guarantee those rights,
making all men equal before the law. All individual members of a national community were
equally protected and punished before the law. The main preoccupation of the nineteenth
century was with citizens’ political rights and the establishment of the parliament and other
representative structures where, by virtue of political membership in a nation-state, all were
to enjoy representation, to elect and be elected. The right of representation that marks most of
the citizenship debates and struggles of the nineteenth century constructed the representative
practices and institutions in place today in the Western liberal democratic societies. The
twentieth century’s principal gain, Marshall argues, was citizens’ social rights as embodied in
welfare policies and as guaranteed by state welfare agencies that protect citizens from
economic uncertainties. In Marshall’s view, citizens use their universal civil and political
rights and the legal and representative structures set in place during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries to achieve social rights that address their basic socioeconomic needs. In
this liberal formulation of citizenship, above, citizenship is a set of universal rights for
citizens that have developed in progression from civil to political to social. As such,
citizenship operates through a democratic social contract by which the state grants and
guarantees rights to citizens, and citizens agree to a set of duties and obligations.

These important principles of citizenship as constituted through a liberal democratic
social contract have been critically examined by much of the contemporary social science
literature. Sociologists like Giddens (1982) critiqued the evolutionary account of citizenship
rights as cumulative, developing in an almost linear progression where one form of rights led
to the next (also see Friedmann 2002). Moreover, critics assert, assuming social rights to be
an outcome of representative politics conceals the class interests of the bourgeoisie in
stabilizing capitalism through its welfare policies (Mann 1987), as well as the larger social
movements beyond representative politics. It is pointed out that the social rights achieved in
the twentieth century were the outcome of larger union struggles and socialist movements,
not merely of political citizenship and representative politics (Turner 1990). Bryan Turner’s
analysis of citizenship coming from above and from below pushed the critique of liberal
citizenship further by pointing out its top-down and formal bias (Turner 1990). Articulating
different forms of citizenship emerging from above and below and through the public or the
private sphere, he points out that liberal democratic conceptualizations capture only the
processes that take place from above and through public realms.

Feminists have mounted fierce critiques of a formal, state-centered and top-down
understanding of citizenship (Lister 1997; Yuval-Davis 1997). They uncover the hollowness
of the modern era’s promise of inclusion and universal political rights when women are
excluded from formal structures of political representation. Moreover, feminist scholars and
political theorists have redefined the arena of politics, expanding it from the formal
parliaments and representative structures dominated by men to include women’s informal
political activism in neighborhoods and residential communities (Jelin 1990; Staheli and
Stressing the plurality of forms of politics, feminists argue that the formalist notions of
politics and political citizenship by default render women’s citizenship invisible. Articulating
the notion of informal politics as an equally important realm where citizens negotiate their
rights vis-à-vis the state, feminists have made important inroads in the citizenship debate,
opening it to alternative interpretations.

2. Decentering the State in Citizenship Debates

In the last three decades, the debate about citizenship has been reinvigorated. Since the late
1980s, the global restructuring of capitalism and the emergence of neoliberal modes of
governance have privatized social risk—undermining the responsibilities of the state for
public well-being in favor of the free market and a shift of that burden to the citizens. Concomitantly, we have seen the rise of social movements not only among marginalized populations that were never included in the universal promises of liberal citizenship but also among newly disenfranchised citizens who have responded to the erosion of the welfare state in Western liberal democratic societies by taking on the effort to recover their rights. The 1990s experiences of liberal democracies shaped in post-socialist Eastern Europe and in post-Apartheid South Africa have been revealing. In post-socialist Eastern Europe, citizens attained civil and political rights, but lost many of their socioeconomic entitlements and rights—for example, to social housing. In post-Apartheid South Africa, on the other hand, the black population gained recognition of full civil, political, and social rights through their new constitution, but could not access newly attained basic social rights like decent shelter and fundamental urban services, as demonstrated by the large number of evictions occurring between 1996 and 2006.¹

In such contexts, the last three decades have exposed the disjunctures between civil, political, and social rights, and we have witnessed an unraveling and restructuring of the project of liberal citizenship. From both the left and the right of the political spectrum and in both theory and practice, we see a move away from the state-centered notion of citizenship that lies at the core of liberal citizenship.

Conservatives, for example, highly vocal in the critique of a state-centered citizenship, undermine the liberal social contract that guarantees social rights through welfare policies by insisting instead on broader citizens’ responsibilities and obligations that relieve those of the state. This formulation celebrates active citizens: individualized, self-reliant, responsible, and in need of no government assistance, since they have only themselves to praise or blame for their social welfare. Conservatives’ arguments that justify shrinking the state’s responsibilities toward its citizens as a way to promote active citizenship are rejected
by their critics (Kearns 1992; Ong 2003) as promoting the production of “neoliberal
subjects.” Though the progressive left also calls for decentering the state in the expectations
of citizenship, its point of departure is an opposing set of social commitments. The
progressive left’s advocacy of a citizen-centered citizenship does not sidestep the state’s
responsibility for its citizens’ welfare but, rather, calls for a more inclusive notion extending
beyond the state to include the participation of a range of actors that ensures the actuality of
rights (see Kabeer 2002; Cornwall 2002; Gaventa 2002).

As delineated by contributors to the special issue of Institute of Development Studies
Bulletin (Gaventa 2002) on citizenship, these alternative conceptualizations articulate
citizenship not as a given but as a practice. Their inclusive formulation of citizenship stresses
the importance of people’s actions and their everyday practices to secure abstract rights. The
authors decenter the state by highlighting the limitations of the formal rights the state grants:
inscriptions of rights by state institutions and laws are necessary and can facilitate the
citizens’ struggle, but in and of themselves those are insufficient to ensure rights in practice;
they cannot be materialized without citizens’ practices on the ground. Accounting for the
complexity of entangled formal and informal processes results in a nuanced analysis
revealing the range of agents beyond the state who act to achieve the civil, political, and
socioeconomic rights promised to citizens. Such an alternative, inclusive perspective views
citizenship not as an object such as a bundle of laws or decrees but as a process constructed
both as a process from above through legal and institutional arms of the state and from below
through citizens’ everyday actions both formal and informal. Citizenship is articulated as
practices that generate “new sources of laws” (Holston and Appadurai 1999, 20).

3. Citizenship from Below

To better understand this emerging notion of citizenship as practices grounded in civil
society, I offer two observations from the field: one from the Western Cape, South Africa,
and the other from the Midwest of the United States. Elsewhere (Miraftab 2006, 2009), I have published a detailed case study of South Africa’s Western Cape Anti Eviction Campaign (AEC), a grassroots movement that resists the eviction orders of the local state and private banks so as to help the poor to keep the roofs over their heads. The AEC also asserts poor residents’ rights to basic urban services by reconnecting those that the municipal government or private sector disconnects for nonpayment. The AEC practices expose the hypocrisy of the post-Apartheid state in granting constitutional rights to shelter and basic services, yet issuing eviction orders to those unable to pay for rent or utilities. It is important to recognize how this contradiction reflects the country’s larger paradox, whereby its political liberation led to its neoliberal economic transformation (Miraftab 2008). In the country’s political liberation, the 1996 constitution granted citizens universal civil, political, and socioeconomic rights; at the same time, the adoption by the state of the neoliberal Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy privileged the private sector’s growth over equity and realignment of the skewed property ownership patterns wrought by Apartheid. As a result, many South African citizens were left unable to enact their constitutionally inscribed rights to shelter and basic services. Their constraint this time is accomplished not through racial categorization but because the contemporary free-market economy has marginalized them economically.

The AEC case study, however, reveals not only the inadequacy and unwillingness of the state to deliver on the constitution’s promise of universal post-Apartheid citizenship but also the potent capacity of the poor and their organizations to feed, to dress, to shelter, to make their voices heard—in short, to participate in governing their lives, communities, and city. In the AEC movement we see how poor black South African citizens rely on their own innovative practices to enact their recently obtained constitutional right to shelter and basic services. Using formal legal rights, they construct through their own, often extra-legal or illegal actions the meaning of inclusive and universal citizenship in post-Apartheid society.
To realize their citizenship rights fully, campaign activists use both sanctioned channels (invited spaces of citizenship) and defiantly innovative, oppositional practices (invented spaces of citizenship). Their flexible actions are not confined by the legal parameters of formal citizenship (for details, see Miraftab 2006 and 2009).

The current conditions of post-Apartheid South Africa cast a harsh light on the limitations of constitutionally inscribed rights, revealing how distinctive citizenship rights cannot simply be bundled together, with one leading to and guaranteeing another, nor can the legal rights of citizens guarantee that those rights will materialize in citizens’ lives. Formal political and civil rights of citizenship are necessary, but for marginalized populations they are not sufficient to provide tangible rights to shelter and basic services. In the South African case, while the majority citizens’ political citizenship has expanded, their substantive conditions of life have not improved. Indeed, some data demonstrate that for the poor and those that Apartheid categorized as nonwhite, substantive conditions have worsened (see Terreblanche 2002).

Another example similarly illuminates the limitations of a state-centered understanding of citizenship as a formal status and set of rights granted by the state. This example comes from the experience of immigrants in the United States, many of them undocumented, whose access to food, shelter, and education improves despite, not because of, their status vis-à-vis the state. In an economically distressed, rural town of the Midwestern United States, the corporation Cargill recruits an immigrant labor force for its meatpacking plant. The town’s formal politics of citizen participation in governance—for example, through an all-white and native-born city council—are exclusionary. The town’s immigrants, however, are fashioning new forms of citizenship that afford them remarkable inclusion in public institutions and in public spaces. In a town that until not long ago was kept all white by the brutally racist practices of sundown towns, today we see high residential integration,
with almost every block racially integrated;² high homeownership rate among Mexican immigrants,³ with many of them joining the local landlord class; a multilingual education system in that has adopted a dual-language program with students receiving half their education in Spanish; and a notable presence of immigrants in public space—through cultural identity celebrations (e.g., Mexican Independence Day or Africa Day) and through numerous multiracial soccer clubs playing in outdoor fields (for an expanded discussion and details see Miraftab fortcoming and 2011).

In my ethnographic study of community change in this Midwestern town, I have witnessed the importance of informal politics and innovative everyday practices and struggles through which subordinate groups renegotiate their social spatial and interracial relations. The gains listed above were not decrees granted by the town’s unsupportive local government. Rather, these are gains built from below by the efforts of immigrants and their allies through their everyday practices and informal politics. For example, the adoption of a dual-language school program resulted from a tireless door-to-door campaign by residents and teachers to convince parents in both Spanish- and English-speaking families of the value of multilingual education.⁴

The foregoing examples are not meant to romanticize either the hardship of immigrant workers in the Midwestern meatpacking industry or the plight of homeless families in South African townships. Rather, the aim is to unbundle the understanding of citizens’ substantive citizenship from the state’s legal and formalist citizenship project. The case studies illuminate the disjuncture between formal and substantive rights and the inadequacy of a state-centered analysis. In the South African case, township residents with full formal citizenship rights must fight against evictions that contravene their constitutional right to shelter; in the Midwest, a rural town’s undocumented immigrants achieve home ownership and the security of shelter despite their undocumented status vis-à-vis the state. It is evident in these examples
that neither the source of citizenship nor the benefits it should embody are solely the grant of
the state, but arise from the practices that citizens embark on to make a meaningful difference
in their lives and livelihoods. The access to shelter achieved by the Anti Eviction Campaign
or by the Midwestern immigrants is gained not through legal and formal entitlements but
through claims-making struggles on the ground.

4. Citizenship Rights and Justice

An important question for planning scholarship in the emerging debates on citizenship
concerns the relationship between rights and justice, and specifically the caveat not to
confl at the two. Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness (1971), which builds on the liberal
notions of the social contract, helped planning scholarship to recognize how equal rights and
equal treatment of unequal citizens are not fair and do not lead to a just outcome. While urban
dwellers may have equal rights to choose their residential locations, spatial inequalities
persist—a recognition that prompts not only the state’s redistributive policies but also several
streams within a progressive planning movement, including advocates of equity planning
(Krumholz 1994; Krumholz and Forester 1990) and guerrillas in the bureaucracy (Needleman
and Needleman 1974). Feminist scholars of citizenship and political philosophy like Iris
Young (1990) have further deconstructed the assumed unity of rights and justice. The project
of justice, Young argues, is broader than individualized rights and fair treatment. To reach a
just outcome we need to recognize self-determined and group-based forms of oppression. The
mantra of “no redistribution without recognition” highlights the failure of welfare policies
that may satisfy beneficiaries’ rights as individuals yet through stigma oppress them as a
group. Recognition of group-based differences has been most influential in the progressive
planning debates on multicultural cities (Sandercock 1998a, 2003; Milroy 1992; Harwood
2005).
Such understanding of justice as encompassing more than abstract universal rights has shifted the core attention of the citizenship debate and practice from representation to self-determination. Disentangling abstract rights and substantive justice focuses on the value of citizens’ self-determined experiences of oppression and justice, and hence validates their direct action. That change in perspective ultimately privileges participatory democracy over representative democracy.

In current debates about citizenship, direct participation and control are framed as insurgent citizenship. The term, coined by Holston (1998) and introduced to planning scholarship by Sandercock’s insurgent historiographies (1998b), sheds light on the spatial struggles and practices of those that the false promises of universal citizenship exclude. Whether among “minoritized” populations of the Global North or marginalized residents of the Global South, insurgent citizenship refers to democratic practices where citizens do not relegate the defense of their interests to others—be they politicians, bureaucrats, or planners—but take the matter into their own hands. Through insurgent citizenship practices, grassroots groups assert their right to the city and take control of the necessities for decent life. Insurgent citizenship practices do not excuse the state from its responsibilities; rather, they hold the state accountable through means beyond the state-sanctioned channels of citizen participation. The practice of insurgent citizenship is not confined to invited spaces of citizenship such as the Senate, the municipal councils, the planning commission’s community hearings, citizen review boards, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Such citizenship practices occur as well in self-determined invented spaces where citizens participate through direct action, often with oppositional practices that respond to specific contexts and issues (Miraftab 2006, 2009). Examples are grassroots organizations and activities such as South Africa’s AEC reconnecting households’ water services and returning evicted families to their homes; Argentinean picateros reclaiming abandoned industries;
Berkeley’s homeless appropriating and using the People’s Park (Mitchell 2003); or Chicago’s Anti Eviction Campaign (Southside Solidarity Network) that stopped housing evictions. Grassroots actions that do not stop at the limits of formal rights but go beyond them to make decisions and act across invented and invited spaces of citizenship are insurgent practices of citizenship (see Miraftab 2006).

This claiming of rights, as Mark Prucell (2003) explains, should be understood not in the limited formal and legalist sense but in the radical Lefebvrian sense of the right to appropriate (and therefore to use) and the right to participate (and therefore to produce) urban space. From this perspective, the urban landscapes of most cities of the Global South are indeed the material and spatial evidence of citizens’ asserting their right to the city—not simply through legal means and bureaucratic channels but also through insurgent practices by which people produce their shelter, appropriate urban spaces, and use the city to secure a livelihood.

In curious ways, as Holston (2008) points out, the insurgent practices of *favela* residents and squatters once again uphold the city, not the nation, as the political community to which citizens claim membership in and assert their rights to. Residents of squatter settlements, *favelas*, and townships take charge of urban spaces. They make their own living space and livelihood not because of but often despite the state’s institutions and laws. The insurgent citizenship practices of such subordinate groups offer an alternative challenging the assumption that the state is “the only legitimate source of citizenship rights” (Holston 1998, 39).

In the social contract that governs liberal democratic societies, citizens as individuals delegate their rights to others—political representatives, bureaucrats, and/or technical experts—to act in their best interests. In contrast, disadvantaged and marginalized citizens who recognize the inadequacy of formal rights turn to direct participation to achieve justice.
They do not hand the advocacy of their interests to others but, rather, directly take part in decisions that affect their lives and shape binding decisions.\(^5\) Participatory democracy inspired by the Lefebvrian understanding of “the right to the city” (1996) consequently promotes a form of citizenship that is multicentered and has multiple agencies, including the citizens and their direct social actions. This insurgent form of citizenship has important implications for planning scholarship.

5. Decentering the State: The Participatory Turn in Planning

How do planning scholarship and practice engage with the changing terrain of citizenship—a social, political, and spatial terrain on which the planning profession has established its enterprise? That is the question I turn to for the remainder of this chapter. I organize my reflection around two key observations.

First, since the 1970s, we have witnessed a decentering of the state in the practices of professional planners. The unraveling of the liberal social contract discussed here with respect to citizenship is reflected in the shifts within planning scholarship and practice. The lean state has neither the resources nor the will, in its agenda of public welfare or infrastructure developments, to hire planners. Consequently a range of other nonstate actors have become the employers of professional planners (Douglass and Friedmann 1998). Consulting firms and corporations set the agendas for urban and regional development decisions, as do the NGOs and nonprofit groups that try to create alternative plans and proposals to bridge the gap left by the state’s restructured activities. Today, multiple actors set the agenda for and define the meaning of professional planners’ practices. The state is no longer the sole legitimating source for planners’ activities.

Second, this move away from a state-centered bureaucratic enterprise has expanded the definition of planning. As the private sector and civil society organizations and their members have taken over many of the public sector’s responsibilities, the plurality of
planning protagonists has made planning, more fiercely than ever before, a site for contestation by actors with contrasting interests and commitments. Now, not only the actions and decisions by powerful corporate interests or affluent hometown associations but also the actions undertaken by disenfranchised and marginalized communities are visible and legitimated as de facto planning. Planning as an exclusive activity undertaken by formally trained and professionalized planners is increasingly questioned not only in theory but also on the ground through the social and spatial production of cities, neighborhoods, and urban livelihoods that occurs through direct grassroots action.

The examples described earlier in this chapter may illuminate these points. In the Midwestern rural town we discussed, for instance, there were no professional planners or planning agencies, nor was there any formal political structure that represented the interests of the minorities and immigrants independent of their citizenship status as naturalized, documented, or undocumented. Nevertheless, the socioeconomic gains of the town’s minority, foreign-born residents were evident, and they arose from the group’s everyday practices to assert their right to the city and a dignified livelihood—not from the state’s decrees or programs formulated by professional planners. Their substantive gains were achieved as the immigrants and their native allies took on the challenges of homeownership, dual-language education, and a multicultural use of public space. Similarly, in the Cape Town example, the development of and access to housing and neighborhood services by township residents took place outside the realm of formal planning. This well-documented reality holds for the poor populations of most Third World cities. Worldwide, citizens participate in insurgent practices of citizenship that create their urban landscapes and are legitimated not necessarily or only through law but through everyday use and persistent claims they make for the production of those spaces.
Such on-the-ground observations have drawn planning scholars and practitioners to expand their understanding of planning beyond their own professional practices. Planning practitioners find themselves increasingly entangled with communities’ collective actions and everyday livelihood strategies in responding to the state’s failure to fulfill its citizenship promises. In this context, planning can no longer afford to be the sole prerogative of professional planners, even given their acceptance of participatory planning.

The emerging conversation within progressive planning, inspired by grassroots insurgent practices of citizenship, offers growing support for the notion of insurgent planning practices (Friedmann 2002; Sandercock 1998b; also see Miraftab, Perera, Roy, and Yiftachel in the special issue of *Planning Theory* on insurgency and informality 2009). Insurgent planning departs in radical ways from the guiding principles of participatory planning. Participatory planning, as understood and practiced in the last three decades, is guided by the assumption that representative democracy works to the best interests of all those with equal citizenship rights, including disadvantaged groups. To the contrary, insurgent planning is guided by an understanding of citizenship as a practice constructed from below through citizens’ direct action for the development of their self-determined political community.

Participatory planning that rests on fundamental principles of liberal representative democracy can achieve only as much as the liberal project of citizenship can. The unfulfilled promises of participatory planning derive from the limitations of liberal democratic citizenship and the fallacy that rightful processes alone can reach just outcomes. A growing critical stance within planning reveals the inadequacy of participation through representative and formal institutionalized channels. This literature exposes how, in a neoliberal context, participatory planning serves as an alibi for elitist, private-sector–driven decisions (Angotti 2008; DeFilippis 2001; Mayer 2003; Miraftab 2003).
Reflecting on decades of participatory planning and the failure of both the liberal democratic notion of citizenship and its representative channels to deliver on the promise of justice, many planning scholars stress the need for citizens’ direct action (e.g., Freidmann 1988; Beard 2003; Sandercock 1998b; Irazabal 2008; Leavitt 1994; Miraftab 2009).

Progressive planning increasingly recognizes the need to move beyond the confines of formal rights as the project of justice. Such a move brings planning to encompass a range of insurgent practices of citizenship that occur outside the formal structures of representation by disenfranchised citizens. This is planning that values direct and self-determined spaces of action and does not confuse representation and participation. Progressive planning in the twenty-first century needs to move beyond participatory planning to recognize, nourish, and promote an expanded and insurgent notion of planning. It is this turn that is pregnant with possibilities for an expanded and more just understanding of planning, both as an ideal and as a realm of action.

6. Conclusion

Planning, a field that is so closely linked to the construction of the modern state, reflects the contested terrain of citizenship. As a profession, planning has been a creation of the modern state and is deeply shaped by the core liberal democratic values of representative democracy as beacon for freedom and equality. In this chapter tracing the debates on citizenship as theory and practice that mediate the relationship between the state and citizens, I have highlighted the crisis of the liberal social contract as the fallacy of its promises of equality and freedom are increasingly exposed. We have seen marginalized communities increasingly take the realization of their rights and the fulfillment of their needs into their own hands through social movements and insurgent practices of citizenship. They do not necessarily consign the production, use, and control of urban space to others, be it politicians,
bureaucrats, or planners, but take charge and through direct action appropriate the city and its resources.

In the 1970s and ’80s, the emphasis on negotiation and collaboration among multiple actors brought to the center of the planning profession a new set of methodologies and understandings that marked a participatory turn in both planning scholarship and practice. A few decades into this participatory and inclusive turn in planning, we need to critically engage its core guiding values and methodologies. In the twenty-first century, just as the understanding of citizenship has shifted from a formalist top-down decree to a set of practices grounded in civil society, so has the understanding of planning as a set of state-sponsored activities changed to acknowledge a set of practices undertaken by multiple and contesting actors.

Progressive planning in the twenty-first century needs to engage with a more nuanced understanding of rights and justice and a clearer perspective on the fundamentally distinctive principles of representative and participatory democracy. These insights highlight the need to recognize, value, and nourish citizens’ insurgent practices that may fall outside or even against formal or state-sanctioned participatory channels.

As structural and institutional forces seek to stabilize oppressive relationships through inclusion, progressive planning in the twenty-first century has the moral obligation to critically reflect on methodology by which the state is decentered and its citizens are included in both citizenship and planning. If it is to promote social transformation, progressive planning’s imperative must be to move beyond a misconceived celebration simply of inclusion to a conceptualization of insurgent planning. Insurgent planning practices pierce the veneer of participation and inclusion to pursue substantive forms of justice.

Acknowledgments
I am most grateful for the insightful comments and suggestions made by Rachel Weber on the earlier versions of this chapter. This chapter has also benefited from a discussion held by participants and panelists (Angotti, Harwood, Marcuse, Sandercock) at a 2009 ACSP roundtable I organized on planning and citizenship.

Notes

1. Data on the exact number of evictions by category or region are unavailable; however, the Municipal Services Project and the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) report that between 1994 and 2002, nearly 2 million South Africans have been evicted from their homes because of service nonpayments (see McDonald and Smith 2004). In addition, the cost-recovery strategies have led to extensive cutoffs of water to disadvantaged households. In the former substructures of Cape Town and Tygerberg, for example, 75,418 households had their water cut off for nonpayment of water bills in 1999 and 2000 alone (2004,1474).

2. In 2000, the white-Hispanic index of dissimilarity for Beardstown was 57.6 compared to 62.1 for Chicago; 63.2 for Los Angeles–Long Beach; and 66.7 for New York (see Diaz McConnell and Miraftab 2009).


4. Beardstown is the only rural school in Illinois with a dual-language program. As of November 2008, in Illinois there were eighteen schools and nationwide there were 335 schools with dual-language programs (also see Paciotto and Delany-Barmann 2011).

5. Participatory budgeting as practiced in Puerto Alegre is the most well known example often used to describe the distinction between representative and participatory
democracy when, at the scale of a city, residents directly take part in a city’s budget allocation (Abers 2000).

6. More than two-thirds of Third World cities are developed through the spontaneous, unplanned activities that Holston (2008) conceptualizes as insurgent urbanization. Eighty-five percent of Third World urban residents “occupy property illegally” (Davis 2004, 6). Moreover, in the labor markets of many Third World economies, formal employment channels have only a minor role. Worldwide, the informal economy has grown as a percentage of nonagricultural employment, by the 1990s reaching 43.4 percent in North Africa, 74.8 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 56.9 percent in Latin America, and 63 percent in Asia (Beneria 2003, table 4.2, 111).

REFERENCES


